

A RECORD OF  
PRESS CONFERENCE  
STATEMENTS

MADE BY

Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN

AND

Representative CHARLES A. HALLECK

FOR

THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE  
REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP



PRESENTED BY MR. DIRKSEN

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**THE JOINT SENATE-HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP**

**FOR THE SENATE**

EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN, *Leader*  
THOMAS H. KUCHEL, *Whip*  
STYLES BRIDGES, *Chairman of the Policy Committee*  
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, *Chairman of the Conference*

**FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

CHARLES A. HALLECK, *Leader*  
LESLIE C. ARENDS, *Whip*  
JOHN W. BYRNES, *Chairman of the Policy Committee*  
CHARLES B. HOEVEN, *Chairman of the Conference*  
CLARENCE J. BROWN, *Ranking Member, Rules Committee*

**PRESIDING OFFICER**

WILLIAM E. MILLER, *the Republican National Chairman*

## FOREWORD

The 1st session of the 87th Congress witnessed a Republican innovation in leadership that had a very unifying effect. The origins of the idea rest with former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Early in January 1961, a short time before the end of his administration, President Eisenhower summoned to the White House the Republican Members of Congress who had regularly attended his Tuesday morning congressional leadership meetings. For the Senate: Everett McKinley Dirksen, Republican leader; Thomas H. Kuchel, whip; Styles Bridges, chairman of the policy committee; Leverett Saltonstall, chairman of the conference. For the House: Charles A. Halleck, Republican leader; Leslie C. Arends, whip; John W. Byrnes, chairman of the policy committee; Charles B. Hoeven, chairman of the conference; Clarence J. Brown, ranking Republican member of the Rules Committee. Also regularly present: Thruston B. Morton, chairman of the Republican National Committee (succeeded as National Chairman by William E. Miller on June 10, 1961).

President Eisenhower pointed out that on January 20 the White House would cease to be the policy voice for the Republican Party and that historically this function had devolved on the Republican leaders of the Senate and the House in their respective capacities when the party was out of power.

After a general discussion, President Eisenhower summed up the conclusions as follows:

- (1) The Republican leaders of the Senate and the House would form a joint group, to be known as the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, with the chairman of the Republican National Committee to act as presiding officer, to hold meetings approximately once a week, after which the Senate and House Republican leaders, as spokesmen, would hold a joint press conference for the newspaper, periodical, TV and radio correspondents.

- (2) When desirable, other appropriate GOP leaders would be invited to meet with the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership.

- (3) For the purpose of coordinating the effort, stimulating research, and carrying out other administrative duties, President Eisenhower suggested the joint leadership be provided with a staff.

The innovation here was the decision to set up a "joint" Senate-House leadership. The obvious advantages of this leadership mechanism were (a) the opportunity for the Senate and the House Republican leaders to speak in a unified voice on Republican policy positions, and (b) the opportunity to resolve different points of view that might exist between the legislative bodies.

The first meeting of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership occurred on January 24, followed by meetings on February 2, February 9, February 16, February 23, March 2, and March 9. Meantime, a staff consultant was retained and, as a result of the experience gained

in the first few weeks, an effort was made to give the meetings a more formalized voice. This led to preparation at the meetings of formal statements to be issued at the press conferences before submitting to questions from the correspondents.

Thus from the leadership meeting of March 23 forward a record of formal statements was kept. They appear here arranged by subject matter, under such headings as "The Berlin Crisis," "Tractors for Cuba," "Conduct of Foreign Affairs," "The Threat of Inflation," etc. Also included are two evaluations of the leadership meetings written near the end of this session of Congress by two noted Washington columnists, Peter Edson of the Scripps-Howard Alliance and Kenneth Crawford of Newsweek.

It should be noted that the members of the joint leadership met in Washington on March 9 with Senator Barry M. Goldwater, on April 20 with former Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and on May 1, in Gettysburg, with former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck had additional meetings with General Eisenhower on July 10, with Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller on September 11, and again with General Eisenhower on September 12.

[From the Washington Daily News, Sept. 7, 1961]

### THE "EV AND CHARLIE" RECORD

(By Peter Edson)

With Congress about to adjourn, the regular weekly press conferences of the two Republican leaders, Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois and Representative Charles A. Halleck of Indiana may be suspended for a few months.

No GOP decision has yet been made on what if anything will take their place during the congressional recess.

Democratic scoffers claim that this "Ev and Charlie" act, as it has been dubbed, will never be missed.

But there is some opinion among Republicans that the Dirksen-Halleck commentaries have been effective, have influenced policy and congressional votes, will be resumed next year. A recap of their criticisms reveals these points:

They blasted any moves to let Red China be admitted to the United Nations. A congressional resolution was passed almost unanimously, opposing any such policy.

They blasted the "two Chinas" policy. It was repudiated.

They blasted the move to recognize Outer Mongolia. The Kennedy administration backed up on the idea.

They blasted the proposed swap of U.S. tractors for Castro prisoners held in Cuba. The deal fell through.

They opposed "backdoor financing" for long term foreign aid. They won. Congress cut the authorization and approved financing by annual appropriation.

They called attention to the increase of U.S. export licenses for trade with Russia. They are being reduced.

Many of these reversals of Kennedy policy were effected with strong support from conservative Democrats.

But in general, not even the Democratic leaders are too unhappy about the Dirksen-Halleck pronouncements on foreign policy. They backed up President Kennedy after the Cuban invasion fiasco. They have consistently backed him on the Berlin crisis. Their effort has been to stiffen the President's stand. They supported his defense buildup.

There has been little carping at President Kennedy himself. But top members of his official family have been singled out for criticism:

Ambassador Averell Harriman for indicating that a neutralist government in Laos might be headed by Souvanna Phouma.

Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles for saying that if India was attacked from any source, U.S. help would be there the next morning.

Ambassador Adlai Stevenson for voting with Soviet Russia against Portugal on Angola.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield for advocating the establishment of a free city in Berlin.

Senator Dirksen and Representative Halleck themselves have not been above such mistakes. Several times they have advocated resumption of nuclear testing by the United States. In view of the bad reaction to Russia's announcement of its intention to resume testing, it is good the United States didn't take this step first.

On domestic issues the Dirksen-Halleck pronouncements have followed the more traditional Republican line.

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[From *Newsweek*, Sept. 18, 1961]

### THE LOYAL OPPOSITION

(By Kenneth Crawford)

President Kennedy is indebted to Republican leaders for the support he has received from them, overt and covert, at the session of Congress now approaching its close. The administration's legislative record, impressive despite recent reverses, couldn't have been compiled without them. The debt will never be acknowledged, not because the President and his associates are unappreciative, but because payment would embarrass the creditors as much as the debtors. With congressional elections in the offing, the fiction that the two major parties represent two wholly different and irreconcilable political concepts must be preserved. Customs demands it.

The weekly press conference conducted by Senate Minority Leader Dirksen and House Minority Leader Halleck—the so-called Ev and Charlie shows—have been artistic performances in their way. The two old troupers have contrived to be critical of the administration in what they have said while upholding its major foreign policies and the legislation necessary to carry them out in what they have left

unsaid. The result has satisfied both the emotional Republicans, who are entertained by partisan gibes at the opposition, and the more sophisticated party men, who like to make a record for the next campaign but understand what the President and the country are up against in Berlin and elsewhere.

#### TEMPTATION RESISTED

In the area of foreign aid, Republican leaders have been nothing less than gallant. They know, as every politician knows, that this item is hard to sell the voters. It would have been easy for them to build demagogic fires against it even before Nehru and Tito, both beneficiaries of U.S. aid, made it easier by their pusillanimous behavior in Belgrade. The temptation for the out party to capitalize on latent isolationism must have been all but irresistible. Yet the minority leadership resisted it.

Dirksen and Halleck opposed "backdoor spending," insisting that Congress retain the power of the purse by appropriating aid money each year to take care of that year's needs, but at the same time supported long-range project planning. Having achieved this compromise, they joined in the effort to give the President most of the money and authority he wanted. At one critical point, Halleck led a contingent of Republicans through a teller line in the House to save a piece of military-aid money from Representative Passman, the anti-foreign-aid chairman of the subcommittee in charge of foreign-aid appropriations.

#### PLANNED POLICY

All this moved one of the highest ranking Democrats in the Capitol to declare Dirksen and Halleck "as responsible and patriotic men as we've ever had in command of a party up here." Deserved as this praise may have been, the Republican leadership's stand on foreign aid can't be attributed solely to noble impulses spontaneously generated in the breasts of Ev and Charlie. This and other positions of the minority have been carefully formulated at closed meetings of the joint Republican congressional policy committee, which was created at President Eisenhower's suggestion just before he left office and which has been influenced by him ever since.

So it is no coincidence that GOP leaders in Congress practice what Ike preaches. They have supported, besides big foreign aid, all Mr. Kennedy's military-spending programs. They have been restrained in their criticism of the administration's failures in Cuba and Laos. When they want to blow off steam, they blow it at Stevenson or Bowles but not at the President himself. They've served notice that they won't stand for admittance of Red China to the U.N. But no Republican leader except GOP National Chairman Miller has charged the administration with ap-

peasement of the Communists in months and he has allowed himself only one such outburst.

On domestic policy, of course, the Republicans, as a party, have been consistently in opposition. But most of the administration's domestic bills have enough constituent appeal to command a few Republican votes and therefore require no organized help from Ev and Charlie.

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## A RECORD OF PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENTS

### THE A-BOMB BAN

May 11, 1961

By Senator Dirksen

It is becoming plain that the United States must reexamine its position with respect to the interminable negotiations on nuclear testing which have been conducted at Geneva since October 31, 1958. There now have been 296 negotiating sessions hinging largely on the question of inspection if a ban on nuclear testing is reached.

With the installation of the Kennedy administration in January this Nation dispatched to Geneva an offer of seven substantial concessions to Russia. Even before these concessions could be announced, the Soviets announced they were retreating from two agreements which had been obtained in previous years. Then, having heard our concessions, the Russians accepted only two of them and balked at the rest. Negotiations since then have been uniformly described by the Western delegates as nothing less than "depressing."

It is perfectly apparent that the Soviets are not negotiating: they are conducting a monumental stall. Because underground nuclear tests cannot be detected, this leaves the Russians free to continue this kind of testing if they wish while we have suspended our own efforts in this field.

On October 9, 1960, during the presidential campaign, Mr. Kennedy asserted that "when I am elected I will direct vigorous negotiation" in Geneva, and added significantly:

\* \* \* I intend to prescribe a reasonable but definite time limit to determine whether significant progress is being made.

In view of the notable lack of progress to this date, we feel that in the interest of arriving at some discernible conclusion, President Kennedy should now fix a time limit and so notify the Russians. We feel that this is not only essential to American prestige but will make clear to the world the true intent of the Soviet Union.

June 8, 1961

By Representative Halleck

A month ago the joint Senate-House Republican leadership suggested that President Kennedy fix a time limit on the interminable negotiations on nuclear testing which have been conducted at Geneva since October 31, 1958. We stated we felt this was not only essential to American prestige but necessary so the world will realize the Soviet Union does not want to reach an agreement. Two nights ago President Kennedy in his report to the Nation on his European trip made it clear that he could not discover during his conversations with Khrushchev a single ray of hope for adoption of a nuclear treaty.

There now have been 317 negotiating sessions at Geneva hinging largely on the issue of inspection if a ban on nuclear testing is reached. The question is: How much longer must America submit to this persistent Soviet stalling?

We know that we have conducted no nuclear testing in this country since 1958. But we have absolutely no evidence that the Russians are not conducting such tests because underground nuclear testing cannot be detected.

We insist that we can no longer take the chance that the Soviet Union will perfect its nuclear weapons while we forego improving ours during interminable meetings at Geneva.

It is now common knowledge that the Russians intend to seek transferral of the nuclear testing negotiations to the agenda of a general disarmament conference, thus junking the Geneva effort. If talks for 2½ years on a single phase of armaments are fruitless, how many more years will we have to live with the possibility the Soviet Union is secretly testing while we risk both our national security and world peace at another conference table?

We believe the United States has been extremely patient in view of the gravity of the issue and we respectfully urge the President to set a deadline on the negotiations and so notify the Soviet Union.

*August 15, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

For many months it has been evident that the nuclear test ban negotiations at Geneva have been a waste of time and that we have been jeopardizing our own national security by continuing our self-imposed suspension of testing.

Twice during these months the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership has raised the question of whether the United States should set a terminal date because it has become increasingly obvious that the Soviet Union has not been negotiating, but stalling.

When these negotiations began 3 years ago there was little doubt we were ahead of the Soviets in nuclear weapons. We know the United States has done no testing during these 3 years. But how about the Soviet Union?

Because there is no present way to detect underground testing, how do we know the Russians have not been testing? How do we know they haven't been stalling to gain time to catch up with us or pass us in nuclear weapons? The answer to both questions is the same: We don't know.

But we do know this: While there is no absolute proof, there does exist enough information to indicate the Soviets have been testing during the negotiations. Further, we can state that this information is known to our highest Government officials. We think action is indicated.

Last week, President Kennedy announced he was sending our negotiators back to Geneva for one more try with the Soviets. We have no objection to this attempt, but we believe it should not be allowed to sandbag the Nation's safety. We say the time has arrived for the United States to resume testing.

We have repeatedly stated that in any meeting with the Soviet Union we must negotiate from strength. In this instance we believe

the United States would be in a far stronger position if we resumed testing and insisted that the Soviet Union come to the conference table with a real desire to negotiate instead of stall.

Let us not forget that 3 years of voluntary suspension of tests has produced no results at Geneva whatsoever. Perhaps testing while offering to negotiate might bring all parties closer to the desired objective—a true nuclear test ban.

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#### AID TO EDUCATION ISSUE

*June 23, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

Mail from over the country indicates a rising tide of opposition to the administration's omnibus bill for Federal intervention in public education, a bill whose major provisions do violence to practically everything the Republican Party has always stood for in this area. This opposition is finding a response in the House of Representatives, since we are answerable to the people who elected us.

We are convinced a vast majority of Americans want to keep the responsibility for public education as close to home as possible. They realize it is inevitable that a Congress which appropriates billions of taxpayer dollars must also police the spending of those dollars.

These citizens, many of them educators, know that States and local communities have been gaining ground, not losing it, in classroom construction, pupil-teacher ratios, and teacher salaries without broadened Federal interference.

We recognize the Government's obligation to help in areas where school needs are aggravated by unusual numbers of children from Government personnel who are not subject to local taxes. This so-called impacted area problem has been handled as separate legislation in the past.

We do not believe the fate of this established program should, or will, hinge on acceptance of the omnibus bill. The Democrat-controlled Congress will not dare let this program die.

But make no mistake about this: the wrangling now going on in the Congress is just a forerunner of what the Nation can expect in future sessions once the responsibility for financing public education, with all its divisive issues, is shifted to Washington from 50 States and thousands of local communities.

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*June 28, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

I want to read the text of a communication from President Eisenhower which is in response to a letter I wrote him regarding aid to education:

DEAR CHARLIE: I appreciate having the material you furnished me in respect to the pending education bills.

It is clear to me that in practically every important respect this legislation is sharply at variance with the principles of good government.

My views on aid to education are well known. Beginning 6 years ago I have advocated Federal help for school construction to replace shortages brought about by war and the depression of the thirties. However, I have always stressed, first, that such legislation be made temporary; second, that it be pinpointed to actual need; third, that there be State matching of the Federal funds; fourth, that no Federal funds be used for such operational expenses as teacher salaries; and fifth, above all else, that we meticulously avoid Federal control of education.

I fail to find convincing evidence that these imperatives have been met. Indeed, I can only conclude that if this legislation were enacted, it would not only become permanent but also, by natural progression, it would ultimately result in Federal control of education. So believing, I am convinced that this legislation should be rejected.

(Signed) DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

#### THE BERLIN CRISIS

July 27, 1961

*By Senator Dirksen*

The greatest hazard in the Berlin situation is the possibility of miscalculation by the Soviet leaders. There are two areas of error into which Premier Khrushchev might fall:

(1) A mistaken notion that because American officials differ among themselves, and because Democrats and Republicans criticize each other, there is no real will to defend freedom so far as America is concerned.

(2) A mistaken belief that the United States will not go all the way—i.e., to nuclear warfare—to meet its commitments in Europe.

Let's set the record straight.

As to the first point, let it be clearly understood that President Kennedy has the complete support of the Republican leadership in Congress in the Berlin crisis. If differences should appear, they would be on how to uphold our Berlin commitments, not whether to uphold them. We are all aware that the issue is not a city named Berlin, but free world unity.

As for the second point, no greater error could be made by Khrushchev than to believe that the United States would point a weapon but not be willing to fire it.

In 1958, in an almost identical crisis on Berlin, President Eisenhower somewhat puzzled people by saying that the United States would not fight a ground war. But Mr. Khrushchev was not puzzled. He knew what President Eisenhower meant—that we'd fight a nuclear war.

There was also a message for Mr. Khrushchev in President Kennedy's address to the Nation Tuesday night. The bulk of the President's request for additional defense expenditures was for expanded ground forces and plane and sea lifts. Nothing was said about need for money for our total strategic striking force—our supersonic planes, our missiles, and our nuclear warheads. The meaning is plain. In that vital segment of our defense, we are ready.

Of course, Congress will want to review the number of ground forces requested and the use contemplated for them. But I think Mr. Khrushchev is going to find the conference table more attractive on the Berlin issue than he has previously indicated.

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#### CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

*March 23, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

This country's representatives in the United Nations, headed by Adlai Stevenson, apparently are embarked on a new diplomatic course that should be clarified by President Kennedy at his earliest convenience.

Last week our NATO partners were dismayed to discover the United States joining with the Soviet Union in voting against Portugal, one of the most faithful of our allies.

The question at issue was a resolution urging internal reform in Angola, a Portuguese colony near the Congo. The nature of the resolution itself was valid grounds for the United States questioning the whole procedure because article 7 of the United Nations Charter specifically forbids inquiring into internal matters.

Despite this we deliberately sided with the Soviet Union and only the action of Britain, France, and other NATO nations resulted in rejection of the resolution. Incidentally, it marked the first time in the history of the United Nations that our country was paired with the Soviet Union on a losing issue before the Security Council—hardly a proud moment for Uncle Sam.

We, of course, realize that American sympathy and support must continue to go to the nationals in colonized areas, but we are convinced there are many avenues preferable to affronting our own allies.

We have been advised that the decision to side with the Soviet Union was made by President Kennedy himself. We feel an explanation is due the American people and our allies.

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*May 29, 1961*

By the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership

Like all Americans, we, the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership want President Kennedy to succeed in his Vienna meeting with Premier Khrushchev 6 days from now.

In June 1960 President Kennedy, then a Senator, laid down certain minimal conditions that should exist before a conference should be agreed to. Mr. Kennedy said:

Our task is to devise a national strategy—based not on the 11th hour responses to Soviet-created crisis—but a comprehensive set of carefully prepared, long-term policies designed to increase the strength of the non-Communist world. Until this task is accomplished, there is no point in returning to the summit—for no President of the United States must ever again be put in the position of traveling across the seas, armed only with vague speculative hope.

These were Mr. Kennedy's words to the U.S. Senate on June 14, 1960. In the campaign, he made it clear repeatedly that a completely worked out agenda was another minimal requirement.

It is obvious that President Kennedy is going to meet with Premier Khrushchev at a time when none of the minimal conditions he suggested exist. Certainly no "comprehensive set of carefully prepared, long-term policies" is yet in evidence. Neither is our position strengthened by the setbacks we have suffered in Cuba and Laos, or by the lack of enthusiasm here in the United States for the Vienna meeting.

We do not know what prompted President Kennedy to agree to the Khrushchev conference but we have certain observations about it which we, the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, want to make.

1. The prime reason why negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States have almost always ended in failure is that the Soviets are negotiating for world domination while we have been negotiating for world peace. These are two completely incompatible objectives. They have destroyed all hope of progress. We think the President should put Mr. Khrushchev on notice that there will be no further substantive negotiations by the United States with the Soviet Union until there is evidence by the Soviets that when they speak of their desire for peaceful coexistence, there be tangible evidence of their good faith.

2. Almost equally destructive to the basic negotiating process has been the always-present Soviet tactic of endless stalling, hairsplitting, recessing, and postponing. Negotiations have been used by the Soviet Union principally to gain time. The President should inform Mr. Khrushchev that such Soviet stalling will not longer gain the Soviet Union time, but torpedo the negotiations forthwith. Again it should be emphasized that only good faith can bring us to the conference table.

It should be self-evident that so long as the Soviet Union adheres to its goal of world domination its talk of peaceful coexistence means nothing. It should be made clear to Mr. Khrushchev that we fully realize this and that until there is a real basis for negotiations, none will be attempted.

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*June 8, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

We are gratified that President Kennedy's trip to Europe appears to have had a beneficial effect on the free world alliance, particularly the NATO nations. Before President Kennedy's departure we expressed our hopes for success in the meeting with Khrushchev. We believe the fact that nothing happened at Vienna is in itself some sort of achievement.

Nevertheless, we are disturbed by some of the impressions brought back to America by President Kennedy. For example: The President in his address to the Nation 2 nights ago declared that the Soviets and ourselves give wholly different meanings to the same words, have different views of right and wrong, and wholly different concepts about the future of the world.

We think President Kennedy's words are extremely significant.

Before the President's departure we suggested that Mr. Khrushchev should be put on notice that the United States would engage in no further substantive negotiations with the Soviet Union until there was tangible evidence of their good faith.

President Kennedy's own observations concerning the lack of communication between the Soviet Union and the United States in any conference is the strongest argument we have heard that Soviet words mean nothing and that we must insist on concrete demonstrations of good faith.

The President had no sooner completed his address to the American people 2 days ago when we were given another demonstration of this truism. The President told the American people that the only prospect for an accord with Mr. Khrushchev was their agreement that there should be an effective cease-fire in Laos. Yesterday, the Communist forces in Laos virtually doubled their active warfare.

It is beyond dispute that the only thing the Communists understand is strength. It is clear that what we now need is leadership of the type demonstrated by President Eisenhower in Iran, Lebanon, Quemoy-Matsu, Guatemala, and other areas. We suggest that instead of spending our energies in planning further negotiations we devote our resources to vigorous moves which the Kremlin will understand. We feel certain the President will have the support of all Americans if he chooses such a course.

*August 15, 1961*

As we move toward a showdown on Berlin it becomes increasingly important for this Nation's officials to speak with one voice of strength and determination.

As members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership we have tried to avoid statements that would in any way weaken America's negotiating position with Communist nations. We feel it is doubly important for leaders of the party in power to do likewise, for on them rests the responsibility for policy.

We can only wonder what the world thinks when President Kennedy correctly announces we are going to stand firm on our Berlin commitments only to have important Democratic spokesmen make statements which are at variance with that policy.

The Democratic leader of the Senate has proposed that Berlin be declared a free city in contradiction to the President's position. Two weeks ago, the Democratic chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Fulbright, declared that he thought closing the refugee escape hatch from East Germany into West Berlin was a negotiable point because, as he put it, "The Russians have the power to close it in any case." It seemed like an invitation to close it, so last Sunday they did.

There have been other questionable statements by prominent administration spokesmen in other areas of diplomacy. Six weeks before negotiations even began on Laos Mr. Kennedy's Ambassador at Large, W. Averell Harriman, said in a TV interview that we would accept a coalition government, and there should be a place in it for the Soviet favorite, Souvanna Phouma.

Statements like these just cited invariably produce two disastrous results: (1) they weaken the bargaining position of the United

States, and (2) they dismay our friends and our allies by a display of contradictions and confusion.

In these critical times why should responsible officials of Government, both legislative and executive, utter inconsistent opinions and statements which convey the impression of weakness and irresolution?

(See supporting data below:)

\* \* \* \* \*

On April 2, W. Averell Harriman, President Kennedy's Ambassador at Large, just returned from a critical visit to the Far East on the Laos problem, was interviewed on television by Senator Kenneth B. Keating of New York. Harriman, despite the unbroken string of Communist triumphs resulting from coalition governments, declared "to start off with \* \* \* I think (the Laos Government) has to be a coalition government." Harriman added that he thought the Soviet favorite, Souvanna Phouma is "a factor that has to be dealt with and I think he should be in any government."

\* \* \* \* \*

On June 14 on the Senate floor, Senate Majority Leader Mansfield proposed "the creation of a free city which embraces all Berlin \* \* \* (to) be held in trust and in peace by some international authority until such time as it is again the capital of Germany. Let the routes of access \* \* \* be garrisoned by international peace teams \* \* \* I make these suggestions \* \* \* as one Senator from the State of Montana, and I make them on my own responsibility."

\* \* \* \* \*

On Sunday, July 30, Senator Fulbright was interviewed on ABC "Issues and Answers" and was asked if he thought closing the refugee escape hatch into West Berlin would be a negotiable matter. Fulbright replied, "Well, I think that that might certainly be a negotiable point. The truth of the matter is I think the Russians have the power to close it in any case. I mean we are not giving up very much because I believe next week if they chose to close their borders, they could, without violating any treaty right I know of. We have no right to insist that they be allowed to come out. As I said, I don't understand why the East Germans don't close the border because I think they have a right to close it. So why is this a great concession? You don't have that right now."

*August 24, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

At our press conference last week, we protested against what we considered free-wheeling remarks and proposals from Democratic leaders in the administration and in the Congress that have the effect of weakening the bargaining position of the United States in critical negotiations with the Soviet Union. In this respect we would like to direct attention to the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Chester Bowles.

When inducted into office, he was widely hailed as a No. 1 "idea man" in foreign relations for the New Frontier. In the 8 months that he has enjoyed this role he has been credited in the press with urging our U.N. vote with the Soviet Union against our ally Portugal on the Angola question, advocating recognition of Communist Outer Mongolia, and authorship of the so-called "two Chinas" concept which has caused our Asiatic allies to wonder if we are changing our minds on Red China's admission to the U.N.

Two weeks ago, Mr. Bowles achieved a fresh pinnacle as the No. 1 "idea man." In New Delhi he told a press conference that if India were attacked, help from the United States would be there "the following morning" whether the aggression came from India's neighbors or "any source whatsoever."

Now this is probably the first time the formulation of a military alliance was ever attempted in a press conference—and, I might add, without referral to the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government which has no military pact with India. In fact Prime Minister Nehru was so shocked he felt compelled to tell the Indian Parliament a week ago today that while he thought Mr. Bowles meant well, "we are not under anybody's protection, nor are we anybody's client in this respect."

We know that Mr. Bowles was recently scheduled to be fired but was not. We do suggest, however, that he either (1) be completely muzzled, or (2) be removed from the china shop of diplomacy lest he break something really costly.

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#### TRACTORS FOR CUBA

May 26, 1961

By Senator Dirksen

While the President is entitled to bipartisan support where national security is involved it does not mean that we must remain mute when conviction dictates that we must speak out in the interest of security.

The disastrous handling of the Cuban invasion has caused America to suffer an enormous loss in prestige abroad. But now President Kennedy has compounded that loss by disclosing his official sponsorship of a so-called citizens movement for the American people to make blackmail payments to Fidel Castro.

What kind of precedent is this? What logic supports this decision? What has become of America's legendary position "millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute"?

Of course, every American commendably hopes that another Castro bloodbath—this one involving the 1,200 invaders of Cuba—can be avoided.

But what is the price—\$15 million worth of tractors? No. It is far greater than dollars and tractors. The price is another loss in prestige; another blow to our fast diminishing world leadership.

What new humiliation will this decision encourage the Communists to visit upon us? Are we not inviting Red dictators behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains to demand ransom for Americans they now hold?

The ransom money for Castro supposedly is being raised to further the cause of "liberation." But it is far more likely to do untold damage than good to the cause of liberation both inside and outside Cuba.

Paying tribute to tyrants is as old as history, but it has never advanced the cause of freedom before and it won't this time.

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*June 22, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

The tractor-prisoner negotiations with Castro now appear doomed to be our Cuban fiasco No. 2. The handling of the Cuban invasion was a disaster in itself, but this tractor project is an incredible piece of business.

First, the administration claimed it had nothing to do with a suddenly created citizens committee to raise money to meet Castro's blackmail demands. Two days later the White House reversed itself and revealed that President Kennedy himself had initiated the movement.

Next, the whole project was immersed in doubt as to legality, there being four areas in question—its corporate charter, its right to export licenses, its possible conflict with the Logan Act, and the tax deductibility of any money collected.

If there has been doubt about the thoroughness with which the invasion plans were considered by the administration, it should be plain to all that even less thought went into the administration's handling of the tractor deal. It was a stumbling performance that has only resulted in further lowering our prestige abroad.

It is to be hoped that the fund-raising committee will quietly dissolve, returning the unopened contributions to their senders before some new embarrassment occurs.

We suggest there is a course open to the administration in the future that might do much to get our foreign policy back on the beam. It would be to consult the appropriate leaders of Congress in advance, a course followed by President Eisenhower during his 8 years in the White House.

The tractor project certainly could have been avoided had this been done, because leaders on both the Democratic and Republican sides of the Senate had already gone on record against the proposal 2 days before the White House authorship was even known.

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#### AID TO DEPRESSED AREAS

*March 23, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

We are very disturbed about the depressed areas bill which is coming along for consideration shortly, because we are convinced the unemployed in those areas have been sadly misled as to what it will accomplish. We are sick and tired of seeing these unfortunate people being treated like a political football.

Mr. Eisenhower sought desperately in both 1958 and 1960 to help areas of chronic unemployment, but the Democrats in Congress were more interested in creating campaign issues than in meeting a need. Now they have the ball and the bill they are presenting to the House simply won't do the job.

For example, our House policy committee analysis shows these facts:

- (1) Only about 1 out of 17 unemployed workers in industrial depressed areas could get jobs under this legislation.

(2) Only about 1 out of 37 underemployed workers in rural areas would be helped.

(3) Only about 1 percent of unemployed workers in both industrial and rural areas could get retraining payments.

Enactment of the bill in its present form is bound to bring bitter disillusionment to the unemployed in these depressed areas.

The only redeeming feature we see in this legislation is the acceptance by the House managers of four important features urged by President Eisenhower, including the vital provision to prevent one community stealing industry from another, with Government help.

Our policy committee is already on record favoring accelerated tax amortization to promote new plant construction and job markets in these distressed communities. This is the most potent weapon in our fight against unemployment.

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### FEED GRAIN AND FARM PROGRAMS

*April 13, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

Although the Kennedy administration has only been in office 2½ months, the American farmers are already losing millions of dollars as a direct result of the administration's determination to force feed-grain prices down by dumping huge stocks of Government-owned grain on the market.

The dumping program has been going on for a month. For example: No. 2 yellow corn fell below \$1.05 per bushel in Chicago at one point, a drop of nearly 15 cents in 2½ weeks and the sharpest market decline in 13 years.

Because corn is king in the grain market and affects other grains, the whole market has been depressed with substantial drops in wheat, oats, and barley at a time when normally there is an upturn in prices.

Despite the fact that Congress in February specifically refused to give the new administration authority to dump, and had the pledge of Secretary of Agriculture Freeman that this would not be done, the dumping is going on nevertheless. The farmers' pocketbook is being squeezed to the tune of at least \$100 million loss in market values. The Kennedy administration is determined to force farmers to participate in what was supposed to be a voluntary reduction in acreage under the newly enacted emergency feed-grain law. To do this they are rigging the market—a practice the Government itself deplores and prosecutes when undertaken by private enterprise.

Not only are farmers being penalized through lower prices for the grains they market but, even more important, the cheap feed policies of the Kennedy administration will certainly encourage unsound expansion of the livestock industry. The results of this folly will not be fully apparent for a time, but by the fall of 1962 it is likely that hog, cattle, and poultry prices will decline disastrously.

This market manipulation is being performed in defiance of Congress. The administration must bear full responsibility for the consequences which are sure to follow.

*September 15, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

If there is one thing the Kennedy administration has clearly demonstrated this year, it is that it has no sympathy or understanding for the farm problem.

In 8 months the administration, despite a specific pledge to the Congress not to do so, has dumped over 230 million bushels of corn on the market compared to less than half that much in the corresponding period of a year ago. The loss to farmers in depressed prices has run into the millions and millions of dollars.

In addition, the so-called corn program which was to retire 20 million acres of corn land from production this year actually failed to do so by more than 4½ million acres, yet the Government paid the full price of \$680 million. This means that \$150 million of that money went for phantom acres that either did not exist or were never planted in corn anyway.

But that is not all. This multimillion-dollar program was supposed to create a 700-million-bushel shortage of corn. It has failed to do so. In fact it now appears that production and marketing figures will be approximately in balance.

This means that there will be the equivalent of a 700-million-bushel overhang on next year's market which promises to be as dismal for the farmer—and the taxpayer—as this year's market.

But the damage has not been confined to the feed grains market. The livestock, poultry, and dairy industries, as users of feed grains, have been thoroughly disrupted. Their losses, due to depressed prices, have also run into the millions of dollars. Now, we have a special committee of the House investigating the drop in poultry prices.

In other words, the maladministration of this program has not only placed heavy losses on the American farmer but on the American taxpayer as well, and the end is not in sight. In fact, it is not too much to venture that we will be feeling the ill effects of this botched job for years to come.

#### THE HANFORD PROJECT

*August 2, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

We are convinced that the people of this country want their Government to put national security above partisan political considerations.

We realize that the Kennedy administration made a lot of political promises in its 1960 campaign. These promises have already increased the cost of government on the homefront by billions of dollars. But we must never forget that we can spend ourselves to destruction without a shot being fired. This is what Mr. Khrushchev wants.

If President Kennedy really wants to make a start on economy, we have a suggestion.

Right now the Congress can save \$95 million by rejecting the proposal to use the plutonium reactor at Hanford, Wash., to create electric power at a substantial loss to the taxpayers. This project will not only operate at a loss, but it will also increase the cost of the basic operation of the installation, which is making plutonium.

Military and scientific experts say it will add nothing of significance to our national defense or our production of nuclear energy.

Moreover, it contradicts the depressed areas legislation we passed earlier this year to help keep industries at home and revive ailing ones, notably the coal industry. We understand and sympathize with the position of the United Mine Workers and the coal industry in opposing this project.

Here is an example of the Federal Government spending money to lose money. A solid majority of the House of Representatives has already rejected this project decisively and will do so again if given the opportunity. We urge the Kennedy administration and the Democrat leadership in the Congress to support us in our efforts to hold down unnecessary spending for programs that just don't contribute to our national defense—or our economic strength—in an hour of peril.

(NOTE.—For further reference to the Hanford project, see the statement by Representative Halleck under "Spenders," Aug. 31, 1961.)

### THE THREAT OF INFLATION

*September 15, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

As we approach the end of this session of Congress—already the greatest spendthrift Congress in history—the evidence accumulates that the Kennedy administration is going to seek even greater spending next year. Economic writers are already predicting that a record-breaking \$90 billion peacetime budget will be presented to the Congress in January.

Recognizing, as we have, the need for additional national defense spending, the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership have repeatedly gone on record this year favoring the utmost economy in so-called domestic spending in a budget that originally was estimated at \$80 billion by President Eisenhower and already has risen to \$87 billion under President Kennedy.

Now, if a \$90 billion budget is in prospect, this whole fiscal problem becomes something far more serious than just an additional burden on the taxpayers. It presents a threat of inflation that simply can't be ignored.

We saw the cost of living rise 48 percent under the last Democratic administration, due mainly to the loose fiscal policies of President Truman. Then we saw the cost of living stabilized by the Eisenhower administration because every effort was made to hold Government spending strictly to essentials.

We think the American people now have the right to ask whether or not the value of their dollar is again going to be reduced because we have the spenders back in office. We think there can be only one answer: If the Kennedy administration seeks, as it must, the vast amounts necessary for national defense and at the same time insists on additional billions for New Frontier schemes, then prices are going up and the value of our dollar down.

Additional defense spending necessitated by the Berlin crisis has already increased the tempo of the national economy. We say that

reductions in proposed domestic spending are absolutely essential lest our whole economic structure be again subjected to the depleting effects of an inflationary cost-of-living spiral which, in the final analysis, does its greatest damage to those people least able to stand it.

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#### TRADE BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

*August 24, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

On several occasions we have applauded President Kennedy's efforts to stand firm on our Berlin commitments, while we condemned the State Department's contradictory flirtations with U.N. recognition for Red China and Communist Outer Mongolia.

We think that there is another department of the Government which is contributing to confusion, almost as much as the State Department—the Department of Commerce, which controls American exports to the Soviet Union and its satellite countries.

According to the Commerce Department's own records, the dollar volume of U.S. goods licensed for shipment to the Soviet bloc increased 800 percent in the 3 weeks after President Kennedy's address to the Nation on Berlin compared to the preceding 3 weeks. These licenses covered such items as railroad equipment, synthetic rubber, chemicals, and other materials which the Commerce Department ruled would not increase the warmaking potential of the Soviet bloc.

In June, the Commerce Department took another amazing step. Despite the fact that Communist food shortages were causing Khrushchev to recommend eating horsemeat, the Department announced that surplus farm commodities, subsidized by the U.S. taxpayers, would be sold to the Soviet Union and its satellites if they would pay in dollars.

As recently as 3 weeks ago export licenses were being OK'd for shipments of American-manufactured ball bearings and machine cutting tools to the Soviet Union, and aircraft ground and maintenance equipment to Communist Czechoslovakia.

Yesterday the House Rules Committee reported a resolution for a House investigation of the administration and enforcement of the laws covering control of exports. We Republicans will support the resolution, but we suggest that President Kennedy meantime consider strict curtailment of export licenses on shipments to the Soviet bloc until a policy in line with our Berlin stand can be worked out with the Commerce Department.

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#### A LEGISLATIVE REPORT TO IKE

*May 1, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen (following a meeting of the members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership with former President Eisenhower).

When General Eisenhower invited us to meet with him here in Gettysburg, he asked that Congressman Halleck and I brief him on the congressional picture. We have just completed that task and I imagine you would like to know what we told General Eisenhower.

Of course, because the Senate is concerned with foreign policy, I had to touch on Cuba in my report to him. We told General Eisenhower that Members of Congress on both sides of the aisle were badly shaken by the Cuban matter.

I took some pride, however, in relating that Republicans have supported President Kennedy in the Cuban crisis, in the belief that once a nation is committed by its President, we must present a united front to the world.

As to the Kennedy program in Congress, we pointed out that we had already received more than 35 legislative communications and messages, in fact Congress has been inundated with them. But I had to report in all honesty to General Eisenhower that not one of the Kennedy proposals has generated any enthusiasm on either the Democratic or the Republican side nor can we find any evidence of real support for the Kennedy program by the American people.

Now the Kennedy program is just what everyone expected—deficit spending, increased Government controls, increases in the Government payroll, more welfare statism—that inevitable price which we must pay the piper—eventually more taxes.

It may be called the New Frontier but the Kennedy program is the old New Deal taken out of an old warming oven. It was hot stuff 25 years ago but time has passed it by.

I think that is why the Kennedy program has not found ready acceptance to date with both the Congress and the public and I so advised General Eisenhower.

*May 1, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

I was in agreement with Senator Dirksen in telling General Eisenhower that the Kennedy program has laid a big egg so far. I think it has just about talked itself to death.

We had some research done on the word content of the New Frontier. My friends, if all the New Frontier words were drops of water, we could irrigate the entire Far West with enough for the Gobi and Sahara Deserts too.

Mr. Kennedy used more than three-fourths million words in 1960 campaign speeches. His Government task force reports and 35 communications to Congress have added up to another 250,000 words. This brings the verbal output of the New Frontier to 1 million words and all we have to show for it so far are an extended Unemployment Compensation Act, a feed-grain statute, an extension of the Sugar Act and a depressed areas law.

The quality of the legislative proposals from the White House so far has hardly been worthy of the 1960 campaign speeches which President Kennedy made. We have seen no legislative proposals which would deal in any lasting way with economic or unemployment problems; no policy utterances that might be raising our prestige abroad.

It was with some pleasure we advised General Eisenhower that on many things on which the Democrats had disagreed with him last year they now agree—for example, the amount of immediate increase in minimum wages, a number of provisions in the depressed areas legis-

lation, including industrial raiding, and, most remarkably, personal diplomacy. Evidently, when they have to be responsible for what they do, they see more nearly eye to eye with General Eisenhower.

In conclusion, I frankly told General Eisenhower that the American people certainly missed his wisdom and sure hand in Washington and if he ran for President tomorrow he would win by the biggest landslide in history. I think he liked that.

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#### THE RED CHINA AND OUTER MONGOLIA QUESTIONS

*April 13, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

The Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership has been very concerned about persistent rumors that our Government's position on the admission of Red China to the United Nations is softening.

Yesterday the Associated Press carried a story from London to the effect that President Kennedy in his discussions last week with British Prime Minister Macmillan had agreed not to oppose U.N. debate next fall on Red China's bid for a seat, and, further, that a revision in American policy was underway to condition the American people to acceptance of Red China's admission a year or so hence.

We are most happy that President Kennedy in his press conference later yesterday denied the news story in full. The President said, however, that Prime Minister Macmillan had discussed these proposals with him. We realize that when the head of one government who is our guest has a proposal our President must extend the courtesy of listening to it. But it is very heartening, we believe, to the American people to know that our President did no more than listen.

We want to uphold the hand of the President in his stated opposition to any change in our policy on Red China—as he put it—“under present conditions.” Therefore the Joint Republican Leadership agreed this morning that we will cause to be introduced resolutions restating the opposition of Congress, already recorded 13 times, to any change in our present policy. We will invite Democrats of both the Senate and the House to join in sponsorship of this resolution and we believe that many will be happy to do so. We will also consult with the Democratic leadership of the Senate and House on scheduling consideration of the resolutions at the earliest possible moment and we are convinced they will be adopted overwhelmingly by both branches.

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*June 28, 1961*

By Senate Dirksen

In April the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership called for bipartisan sponsorship of a congressional resolution restating American opposition to admission of Red China to the United Nations.

Resolutions were introduced in the Congress on May 3—in the Senate by Majority Leader Mansfield and myself; in the House by Representatives Zablocki and Judd of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Joining in the sponsorship were 12 Republican and 3 Democratic Senators and 46 Republican and 20 Democratic Representatives.

Nearly 2 months have passed without action. Meanwhile out of the State Department have been coming distressing stories of a new offer we are considering making on the Red China question.

Supposedly the United States will back an offer that Red China have equal representation in the U.N. General Assembly with Nationalist China. This is supposed to infuriate Red China which wants the ouster of Nationalist China from the U.N., and therefore Red China will refuse our offer.

However, there is a flaw in this devious State Department reasoning. Nationalist China says it will withdraw from the General Assembly if Red China is admitted. Supposing Red China decided to take advantage of this fact and accepted membership in the General Assembly? Then where would we be? Nationalist China would be out and Red China in.

We are appalled at this dangerous guessing game. Now is no time for the State Department to be playing Russian roulette with our Red China policy.

We insist that now is the time for Senate and House consideration of the resolution opposing admission of Red China to the U.N. Any further delay can only be interpreted abroad as still another sign of American weakness.

*July 13, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

It is the desire of the Republican leadership to support complete firmness in our policy in Berlin. But we must be equally firm on the question of recognition of Red China and Outer Mongolia, otherwise our position in Berlin will be weakened. Let me specify—

On April 12, following discussions in Washington with British Prime Minister Macmillan on the subject of Red China's admission to the U.N., President Kennedy told a press conference he was opposed to any change in our policy on recognition of Red China.

The next day, April 13, Congressman Halleck and I, as spokesmen for the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, announced our complete support of the President's statement, and invited Democrats in the Congress to join us in sponsorship of resolutions reaffirming the American position on the China question.

Unfortunately, in the 3 months since, these bipartisan resolutions have been bottled up in Congress at the State Department's suggestion, while a flood of news stories has emanated from Washington that the State Department was studying sponsorship of a U.N. resolution admitting Red China.

But that is not all. Concurrently, there have been a number of stories concerning State Department consideration of American diplomatic recognition and a seat in the United Nations for Communist Outer Mongolia. Last Saturday it was announced from Moscow that Outer Mongolia has advised the United States it accepts our proposal for diplomatic ties.

Needless to say, we are deeply disturbed by any efforts that will accord any additional recognition by this country to Communist countries, and doubly so at a time when unity of the free world is of the utmost importance on the Berlin question. We respectfully suggest to President Kennedy that he clarify the situation at his earliest

opportunity and we pray that when he does, the State Department's maneuverings in the Far East will be halted and that the President will reaffirm our strongly anti-Communist position in Asia.

*July 13, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

I want to join Senator Dirksen in stressing our deep concern over the State Department's actions in Asia when the attention of all of us should be directed toward Berlin and a rallying of the free world to the Berlin issue.

The continued display of interest by some high State Department officials in the admission of Red China to the U.N. is bad enough, but the sudden emergence of a proposal to recongize Outer Mongolia is simply incredible.

President Kennedy was put on notice about Berlin in his conversations with Khrushchev in Vienna in the first week of June. We are advised that during that week one of our diplomatic officials in Moscow approached Outer Mongolia's Ambassador to Russia and opened discussions on recognition.

Outer Mongolia is the oldest of all the Soviet Union's puppet states having had a Communist regime since 1921. During the crucial 1940's when the Chinese Communists were trying to overthrow the Nationalist Government of China, their base of supplies was Outer Mongolia. In the Korean war, United Nations troops, including American boys, faced two regiments of Outer Mongolian forces and Outer Mongolians also manned antiaircraft guns in the Korean conflict.

It is fair to ask just what Outer Mongolia has done in the interest of world peace to warrant U.S. diplomatic recognition and a seat in the United Nations.

When State Department officials have been called upon in recent days to explain this unbelievable diplomatic sortie, their reasons have been thin indeed. We have been told that we need a listening post in Upper Asia. There have been suggestions that only by admission of Outer Mongolia to the U.N. can the African State of Mauritania be admitted.

No wonder our friends in Asia, including Nationalist China, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippine Republic, are questioning the sincerity of American policy at this very moment.

We think it is of basic importance for President Kennedy to stop immediately these disruptive State Department operations. The free world is looking to us for leadership in Berlin, not confusion in Asia.

*August 31, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

In 3 weeks the United Nations will meet in New York. Because of the Berlin crisis and the announcement that the Soviets are resuming nuclear testing, we think it is doubly important for the representatives of the United States to exert the strongest leadership possible in the forthcoming sessions. Our success could hinge on two issues—the Red China and Communist Outer Mongolia questions.

Unfortunately, for the past several months, our State Department conducted exploratory moves that led many people to fear both Red China and Outer Mongolia would be admitted to the U.N. without our opposition and perhaps with our approval. Further it was no secret that the U.S. Government might accord diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia.

On August 11 the State Department announced that for a considerable period of time it had "been exploring the question of establishment of relations with Outer Mongolia," but had decided against diplomatic ties. At the same time the Department stated: "We favor the retention by Nationalist China of its seat in the United Nations and oppose the admission of Red China."

In view of the previous positions taken by the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, we of course were gratified by these decisions. But we think one more step is needed before the United Nations meets September 19.

So far the State Department has only said that we will not give diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia; it has not said that the United States will oppose U.N. admission for that Soviet puppet state. On the contrary, on April 19 the U.N. was told by one of our representatives, Charles W. Yost, that "the United States will be prepared to support—and even to cosponsor—Outer Mongolia's admission \* \* \*" if our investigation showed Outer Mongolia to be an independent state willing to meet its international obligations.

The Soviet Union has made the admission of the African country Mauritania conditional on the admission of Outer Mongolia. It has been our historic policy to oppose all "package" deals such as this. We strongly urge the State Department to clarify our position as soon as possible and to make it unmistakably clear that we will oppose not only the admission of Red China to the U.N. but of Outer Mongolia as well.

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#### THE SPENDERS ARE BACK

March 29, 1961

By Senator Dirksen

The President's budget messages and the testimony of the Budget Director before the Joint Economic Committee make it quite clear that the new administration will not be bothered by making the books balance. Maybe the decade of the sixties will be the deficit decade. That will be no new experience.

The approach to the Budget problem is ingenious to say the least. First, show that the Eisenhower budget for the year ending in June 1961 was based on miscalculation as to spending and income and turn a small surplus into a \$800 million deficit.

And since there would be a deficit on June 30, according to the new fiscal Frontier figuring, a bigger deficit might not be too unpalatable by spending more. This will prepare the country for a \$2.2 billion budget hole on June 30.

Then condition the country for the next year by setting up two sets of books—one for general spending and the other for defense spending—even though the money all comes out of the same public purse and is paid from the same tax revenues. It is proposed to hike defense spending by another two-thirds of a billion for the year end-

ing June 30, 1962, with a hint that it might be more. Then there will be the built-in increases of other years plus those that this Congress is likely to approve.

The net of all this is pretty plain. The new fiscal Frontier balance sheet will be in the red on June 30; it will be a deeper red on June 30, 1962. The debt ceiling will have to be lifted, and the deficit decade will have a pretty good start.

*May 26, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

For the past 4 months the Congress has been deluged with Presidential messages and communications proposing New Frontier programs. We are told they are still coming. The messages and communications have been vague and mysterious as to the cost of the projects, how long they will be needed, and where the money will come from to pay for them. They have abounded in contradictions, vague goals, confusion, hidden costs, and back-door spending.

For the past 2 weeks we have had staff members making a thorough search of all available material bearing on the cost of the New Frontier programs. They have reported back to us that the fiscal picture is projected so far into the future as to be unintelligible. They say there is such a welter of concealed authorizations, contractual commitments, and loan and subsidy programs, that dependable cost figures are impossible to obtain. However, by taking the New Frontier's own minimum estimates, it appears likely that approximately \$60 billion additional will be spent by the Federal Government over the next 5 years. The calculation is that the Federal budget will reach at least \$125 billion by 1965, if not sooner, compared to \$80 billion in President Eisenhower's last budget.

As indicated, we cannot, through no fault of our own, vouch for the accuracy of these figures. In fact we are convinced that we cannot find out what the programs will cost and that President Kennedy has no man in his administration who knows what they will cost. If the President does have such a person, we will be happy to invite him to our next leadership meeting to advise us what the costs will be and where we are headed.

Nevertheless, our research convinces us that we are entering a jungle of unprecedented spending and loose fiscal policy. Never in the history of our country has any administration so blindly plunged into the future with so little thought or so little preparation. It is plain that the Congress is going to have to exercise the utmost scrutiny and wisdom if this country is to be saved from a fiscal disaster of major proportions.

*June 15, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

It now appears that President Kennedy intends to spend in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, at least \$5 billion more in cash outlays than proposed by President Eisenhower and to obligate \$9 billion more under contractual authority. This serious fiscal picture raises some very important questions as to what we can afford.

For example, it is becoming more evident every day that President Kennedy must soon decide which he thinks is more important to our people—the New Frontier domestic programs or our national security.

The President sponsors a \$4 billion aid to education program, a \$9 billion housing program, a \$5 billion medical care program, and many other measures totaling more billions. At the same time the President tells us how dangerous the world situation is and calls for more and more individual sacrifice to meet the threat of communism. Mr. Kennedy describes "how long and hard a struggle must be our fate as Americans"; he urges us "to meet our responsibilities, however burdensome they may be"; and he suggests that we ask not what the Government can do for us but what we can do for the Government.

These are brave and commendable words, but we think it is about time the Kennedy administration applied some of its preachments to itself. Just where the Federal Government has tightened its belt under the New Frontier is difficult to discover. The administration's proposals for more and more welfare spending come thick and fast; the prospective deficits mount hourly.

When President Kennedy sponsors legislation to permit the purchase of \$15,000 homes with no money down and 40 years to pay, the citizen begins to wonder what kind of sacrifices Mr. Kennedy is talking about. When the citizen reads that the national debt is climbing daily, he wonders whether it is he or his children the President believes should do more for their Government.

If we are going to develop a national willingness to sacrifice, the pace must be set in Washington. And the best place to start would be on a Presidential revision of the budget aimed at eliminating all but the most essential expenditures.

*June 15, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

If there is one thing I believe the people of this country want more than anything else it is for the leadership in Washington to protect our country against the threats of Mr. Khrushchev and everything he stands for.

When I say leadership, I include the leadership in Congress.

When I say everything Mr. Khrushchev stands for, I am talking about the kind of New Frontier schemes that foster further centralized government at the expense of local authority, private enterprise and individual liberties.

Currently, most of our attention is being directed to activities by the President and his administration involving global aspects of the cold war between the Communist bloc and the free nations of the world. We are spending most of our time worrying about, and billions of dollars trying to prevent, the spread of communism.

No one will deny our obligation to help free, friendly nations stay free.

But the overriding obligation we face is to keep ourselves free in the process.

On more than one occasion Mr. Khrushchev has predicted that the grandchildren of present-day Americans will be living under socialism. I, for one, do not underestimate Mr. Khrushchev's powers of observa-

tion. At the rate we have started under this administration it may be our children who will live under socialism.

I think it is high time for the Congress to take a long, hard look at spending proposals now before us that would play into Mr. Khrushchev's hands by pushing this country farther down the road to socialism.

While I'm naturally concerned about what the Kremlin might try to do to us, I am also concerned about what we are doing to ourselves.

*July 27, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

The need for a conclusive stand on Berlin is unquestionable. I doubt if there is a Member of Congress on either side of the aisle who will not support the necessary steps to bring this about.

However, I think most Americans will agree with me that as defense costs rise it is imperative that the Government retrench on other programs.

On May 26 at one of these press conferences I made an analysis of the unprecedented New Frontier spending and concluded with these words:

Never in the history of our country has any administration so blindly plunged into the future with so little thought or so little preparation.

This statement was made 8 days before the famous Vienna conference at which Khrushchev handed President Kennedy his ultimatum on Berlin. Fifty-four days have passed since President Kennedy was put on notice concerning Berlin and in those 54 days the administration has not lifted one finger to halt the vastly increased domestic spending program of the New Frontier.

Two days ago the President disclosed that the Berlin crisis itself is going to cost us \$3.4 billion additional. He talked about deficits. He talked about more possible defense spending. He talked about possible increased taxes.

It is easy enough to call upon the American people to make additional sacrifices—to look not at what their Government can do for them but what they can do for their Government. But we have arrived at the day of reckoning. I say it is time for the New Frontier to find out what it can do for government—sound government.

It would make a lot more sense to everyone, and certainly to the masters of the Kremlin, if this administration decided to invest our resources in preserving American security and to spend less on the innovations of some domestic political planners. A presidential message to the Congress proposing cutbacks on domestic spending would be most appropriate.

We of course are determined to support any means necessary to strengthen our Berlin stand and in that President Kennedy has our firm commitment. But we insist that the President owes the American people some substantive reciprocity and while the ordinary citizen is tightening his belt, let the Government do the same.

August 2, 1961

By Senator Dirksen

It has long been agreed that a strong and healthy economy is our first line of defense. This becomes doubly important when a nation is called upon to support multi-billion-dollar moon-shoots, multi-million-dollar weapons, a large increase in military personnel, and a long-range foreign-aid program.

As members of the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership, we are determined that our defense posture be at the maximum strength necessary and that President Kennedy be given the strongest hand possible in the diplomatic cold war. But we feel impelled to repeat that to arrive at this strength the Federal Government has to tighten its belt on all nonessential matters.

We believe these strictures apply not only to the Kennedy administration but to the Democratic-controlled Congress as well. Although President Kennedy on several occasions has asked the Congress not to exceed his budget, there is no evidence that the White House has sought to curtail any specific legislative excesses on which the Congress has already embarked, and they are several.

For example, there are housing, military, veterans, space, and the Youth Conservation Corps authorizations that have broken the budget barriers in excess of \$5 billion. There are other examples but it suffices to say that when the budget itself is already out of balance, direct or indirect contributions to greater deficits, current and future, do not constitute a healthy situation.

Of course the Congress has a right to enact authorizations and appropriate money without regard to the President's budget. But with the White House exhibiting no reticence in spending matters we feel it imperative that Congress show every reasonable restraint possible. The administration has just finished a \$3.9 billion deficit year and is now in a \$5 billion deficit year. This is not a laudable start toward establishment of a sound fiscal policy.

True, there are those who fuzzily confuse spending with progress, but we feel confident from our mail and our own sampling that the overwhelming majority of the American people feel now is not the time for political excesses of any nature.

August 31, 1961

By Representative Halleck

It is becoming plainer by the day that this Congress has been hearing from the folks back home about the need for tightening the purse strings particularly in view of the additional defense expenditures caused by the Berlin crisis.

In the last 3 weeks, the following significant actions have taken place which we believe more nearly reflect the mood of this country than the course followed by the Congress during the preceding 7 months:

(1) On August 8, by a majority of 71 votes, the House eliminated from the atomic energy bill a completely unjustified proposal to spend \$95 million to use the plutonium reactor at Hanford, Wash., to create electric power at a substantial loss to the taxpayers.

(2) On August 29, 2 days ago, a Senate-House conference committee agreed to strike from the foreign aid bill \$1.6 billion in author-

izations for a 5-year period, and, far more important, specified that instead of borrowing the money from the Treasury, the administration must come to the Congress on an annual basis for appropriations.

(3) On August 30—yesterday—the House by a 73-vote majority insisted that an aid-to-education bill extending the impacted areas and national defense education programs, which we are all for, be considered a week hence without \$325 million for a school program with entirely new formula which administration partisans had inserted in the bill without so much as a public hearing or even a reading of the legislation by the Education and Labor Committee.

Congress, in our opinion, now realizes that our people have seen enough Christmas-tree legislation. While I can only speak for the Republicans, I think the disposition of the Congress henceforth is going to be: Provide every dollar needed for defense but tighten the Government's belt on nonessential spending.

Naturally we are proud of the part the Republicans played in this turn of events because it has justified our efforts to support the President in the international crisis while opposing costly programs that could either wait or are not needed under our form of government.

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#### STRUCTURAL UNEMPLOYMENT

*April 20, 1961*

By Senator Dirksen

The New Frontier is overaccenting welfare proposals and has thus far failed to emphasize one of the real problems of the 1960's, namely, built-in, or structural unemployment.

What is really happening is that our economy is coming to grips with the composite results of our inventiveness, our ingenuity, our efficiency, our longevity, the steady increase of women in jobs, our abhorrence of waste, investments abroad and the influx of competitive goods and other factors which have been slowly unfolding for a long time.

We have already seen what has happened to American agriculture as a result of technological improvements. In the last 10 years our farmers have produced approximately 28 percent more food with approximately 28 percent less manpower.

At the same time our industrial workers have also been producing at increased rates in the face of a growing labor force. This has produced some startling results.

A few years ago there were 2 million railroad employees. Today there are 800,000. A few years ago there 700,000 employed coal miners; today there are 200,000. These are extreme examples but the problem is more likely to grow in the industrial field than diminish in the years immediately ahead.

The built-in factors in structural unemployment have been operating for some time and the question is how we handle their increased effect. Obviously there is a shift occurring at an accelerated rate from blue collar work to white collar work, but the acceleration is not great enough to meet technological improvements.

We are setting up a study committee on structural unemployment to advise us on the role of government in achieving the transition in our work and production patterns. We must keep step technologi-

cally, but we must make sure our work force benefits as the changes occur.

*April 20, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

This morning we reached a decision that I believe will go far toward helping solve one of the basic problems now facing this country—the problem of structural unemployment. By structural unemployment we mean those unfortunate individuals whose field of occupation has been wiped out or greatly diminished by technological change.

We have approximately 5,500,000 unemployed and I have seen nothing in the proposals sent to Congress by President Kennedy so far that comes to grips with this basic problem. The simple fact is that the average worker today is capable of substantially greater output than a few years ago because of technological improvement. At the same time, the number of people entering the labor market each year is increasing. The question thus becomes: How can we enjoy all the advantages of technological change and at the same time keep our workers employed?

There have been a number of studies made on this labor problem but none of them has produced a practical solution. Therefore, Senator Dirksen and I have been authorized to set up a small committee of experts to advise us on this problem of structural unemployment.

We believe that we can perform a constructive service by conducting this type of study. The structural unemployment problem is, beyond doubt, going to be with us for many years unless labor and management and Government can form a partnership to meet the problem squarely and fairly and intelligently. In fact, I hope to announce over this weekend a concurrent project we Republicans are developing in the House on this same subject.

The important thing is: The United States must advance technologically, in fact, keep ahead of the world, but at the same time it must do so without imposing undue hardship on the working men and women of this country.

#### WAGE-HOUR SLEIGHT OF HAND

*May 11, 1961*

By Representative Halleck

I think it is time to read into the public record the fact that the American worker is losing nearly a billion and a quarter dollars in increased pay because President Kennedy failed to live up to his campaign pledge on minimum wages. My figures are from the Department of Labor.

In 1960, President Eisenhower worked around the clock trying to get an opposition Congress to raise the minimum wage to \$1.15 as of January 1 of this year. Senator Kennedy personally scuttled the legislation, flatly pledging he would raise it to \$1.25 if elected President.

In February, as President, Mr. Kennedy asked Congress not for \$1.25 but \$1.15, saying it should not go to \$1.25 for 2¼ more years.

Since the \$1.15 does not become effective until September of this year, this means that nearly 2 million covered workers will have lost \$224 million in increased pay that they could have had under President Eisenhower's proposal if adopted last year. That is the price workers are paying for the 8 lost months on the New Frontier.

But that is not all.

When the law goes to \$1.25, 2½ years after President Kennedy pledged it would, the workers covered—some 3 million of them—can ask themselves how much they are out of pocket between Mr. Kennedy's pledge and his performance. The answer is a further loss of \$1 billion in wage increases promised but not delivered. That is the additional price workers are paying for the 2½ lost years on the New Frontier.

Last week, when he signed the new law, President Kennedy said, "I want to express my satisfaction in signing the bill to increase the minimum wage to \$1.25 an hour." Not a word was said about \$1.15. Not a word about the 2½-year wait ahead of the American workers. Evidently the New Frontiersmen think the American worker can't read or write, add or subtract, multiply or divide—or remember. I happen to think they can and will.

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(The following background information was released with Representative Halleck's May 11, statement:)

*August 3, 1960.*—Democratic-controlled Senate-House conferees failed to agree on President Eisenhower's proposed legislation for increasing the minimum wage to \$1.15 effective January 1, 1961, the conference collapsing because Senator Kennedy insisted on \$1.25.

*August 30, 1960.*—"I intend to take this fight to the American people. I am sure that they will support me in November in my goal of a minimum living standard of \$1.25 an hour. \* \* \*" (Senator Kennedy to the minimum wage conference.)

*November 4, 1960.*—"We have a minimum wage—but to be of any help at today's prices it must be raised to \$1.25 an hour." (Senator Kennedy in a campaign speech.)

*February 6, 1961.*—President Kennedy asked Congress for a \$1.15 law plus broader coverage with provision to go to \$1.25 28 months after the effective date.

*May 5, 1961.*—President Kennedy signed the minimum wage bill into law thus making September 4, 1961 the effective date for \$1.15, and September 4, 1963 the effective date for \$1.25.

*February 14, 1961.*—Secretary of Labor Goldberg told the House Education and Labor Committee that there were 1,906,000 covered workers who were making less than \$1.15 and that the increase to \$1.15 would mean an additional \$336 million in their pay envelopes annually. Based on these figures the workers lost \$224 million in their pay envelopes when Senator Kennedy scuttled President Eisenhower's bill (eight-twelfths of \$336 million).

*February 14, 1961.*—Secretary of Labor Goldberg also testified that there were 3,021,000 covered workers who made less than \$1.25 and that the increase to \$1.25 would result in \$836 million more annually in their pockets. This means that the 2-year delay in President Kennedy's fulfillment of his promise to obtain a \$1.25 minimum is costing the workers \$500 million annually or a total of \$1 billion for 2 years (\$336 million subtracted from \$836 million).

#### A SUMMARY STATEMENT

*September 27, 1961*

Joint statement by Senator Dirksen and by Representative Halleck

We can recall no period in our times in which a new administration and Congress—both controlled by the Democrat Party—have promised so much and delivered so little. This was not the longest session of Congress in history—it just seemed like it.

To be sure, the old standbys of most Congresses were passed—foreign aid, social security amendments, highway funds, housing, judgeships, appropriations for defense, extension of expiring laws and the like. Some were the usual; some bore outlandish price tags; some made big government bigger.

But most significant, President Kennedy's major campaign promises stand unredeemed—in fact, appear unredeemable.

His aid-to-education program was rejected.

His tax program was pigeonholed.

His civil rights promises were forgotten.

His medical care for the aged was stymied.

His "do it yourself" farm program was plowed under.

His method of foreign aid financing, called the heart of the program, was killed.

His pledge of fiscal integrity vanished as the administration tobogganed into a huge deficit.

Indeed, the hallmark of this 1961 legislative venture was failure—in leadership, in accomplishment, and in campaign promises fulfilled.

Perhaps it can be said that the crowning success of this session of Congress was, after all, its overwhelming failure.

Surely most Americans upon reflection will find themselves more blessed for what they escaped than for what they received.

For this they can thank, in large measure, a sturdy band of outnumbered Republicans who fought throughout the session with considerable success for a beachhead of sanity in government.