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Senate

VIETNAM

Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. President, on yesterday we had very considerable discussion of the situation in Vietnam, and I think it ranged into the question of the conduct of that struggle.

Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, I suggest that the Chamber be cleared and that there be order.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chamber will be cleared, and we will have order. All attendees whose presence is not needed in the Chamber will remove themselves from the Chamber.

The Sergeant at Arms is directed to see that these instructions to clear the Chamber are carried out.

The Senator from Illinois may proceed.

Mr. DIRKSEN, Mr. President, from time to time inquiry has been made of me about what seems like dissident views that have been expressed on this question of Vietnam, and particularly as it relates to the minority side of the aisle.

I have stated over and over again that the Republican Party umbrella is ample for all purposes and for all shades of opinion. I have only two concerns. The first is, of course, that we do not try to invade the constitutional prerogative of the President of the United States.

The first article of the Constitution does give to the Congress the power of the purse. And, in exercise of that power, we can discipline virtually everything in Government.

The Congress also is the exclusive law-making body in our form of government, and we can abolish every bureau. We can abolish nearly every agency. We cannot abolish the Presidency or the Supreme Court because they are constitutional offices. However, with those exceptions, we can go pretty far in exercising our exclusive function as the one and only lawmaking body. The fact that a whole body of administrative law has developed in this country was only possible under a delegation of power by Congress.

So, we have the power of the purse, and when the Constitution made the President the Commander in Chief, it tendered to him the sword of the country. And that includes not only the conduct of our foreign relations, but also the conduct of any struggle or hostility in which we might be engaged.

The only other concern I have is about my own conduct in this matter. I want to be sure it is in conformity with my conscience and my conviction. Beyond that, it does not make any difference,

because my responsibility is to explore for the facts, to ascertain as much as I can on a given subject, and then to exercise an independent judgment.

Mr. President, I hope I have not failed to do that, for Edmond Burke once remarked in Parliament that he felt he would betray his constituency if he did not do that. I grant the same privilege, the same prerogative, and the same latitude of every Member of the Senate.

What is more, I have no hostility toward criticism. I think it was in World War I that Woodrow Wilson said that in time of war we need more criticism, not less. But always it has to be within the framework of our constitutional power, and we must not arrogate to ourselves the conduct of an external struggle.

I think we have had some lessons in that field. Mr. President, the very Capitol, where we sit in the Senate wing, was destroyed in the War of 1812 because there was too much civil interference with the conduct of that war.

Lincoln did not brook any interference from a committee that was set up on the conduct of the war. I think it was General Grant who said that the greatest aid for him was from none other than Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, because he was interfering with Robert E. Lee and his tactics and his strategy.

Who shall say what the outcome of that war would have been if that great general from the South had been let alone? Nobody knows, but that interference was helpful, and Grant recognized it and paid testimony to it.

So, I grant that right, but I hope always it will be within due bounds. However, criticism, I always recognize.

On Sunday I had an experience and at first, I did not know how it came about. The operator of a very splendid motel in Galesburg, Ill., called me on the telephone. I scarcely know him. He said that he and the city—having a population of about 40,000—were going to be hosts to about 130 or 140 Vietnam veterans, all wounded, who were in the hospital at Great Lakes, Ill.

The whole community was energized to turn out for these youngsters. They lodged them. They fed them. They entertained them. They brought them from Great Lakes to Galesburg, a distance of 150 miles, and they took them back.

I was asked to get on the telephone at 5 o'clock on Sunday and to make them a telephone speech, which I did.

When the speech was over, a sergeant

by the name of Wright was designated to respond to the speech, and he did.

He said:

Senator, we want to thank you. You are in our corner, and you have stood up for us, and you stood up for the cause. And we, the wounded from Vietnam, want you to know it from us. And we say it so sincerely, so simply, so emphatically as we know how. We simply thank you.

What I did first on Sunday was to salute them as a measure of deference, because a salute is given to a superior, and I recognize the superiority of their sacrifice. They come back without legs and without arms. And if anybody wants to see what Vietnam has done, he needs only to go out to Walter Reed, which is an evacuation hospital, to see the results.

When flowers came into my room at the hospital from time to time, I got a cart and went down to the Vietnam wards with those bouquets. They were better for them than for me. However, I have seen what has happened, and I yield to nobody in my hope, in my desire, and in my prayers that somehow this insane and grim and grisly business can honorably come to an end.

I think you have to say that for the President of the United States. I cannot in my position, and I cannot under any circumstances, denigrate him or demean him in the eyes of the world in connection with this controversy by anything that I might say. And so, granting all this latitude to anybody in the legislative branch of the Government, I feel that the time has come to say a little more than I have said on the subject of Vietnam.

I recognize my kinship with those who were out in Galesburg, Ill., by virtue of a common uniform which I wore 50 years ago as a private first class, as a sergeant, and as a second lieutenant in France on the western front. That is a kinship that you cannot forget.

And I want to be sure that almost a half million American boys who are out there in the cause of our country will not be the forgotten men under any circumstances, because they are too precious as Americans who have responded and are willing to do their duty even if the last and supreme sacrifice is required for their services.

I will never forget as I think of the thousands who have now died, in addition to the thousands who have been wounded, the lines of Colonel McCrea, that Canadian doctor who had a field dressing station on the banks of the Ypres River in France, and saw the bodies roll down into the door of his

drawing room tent out there on the front, and who finally committed his soul to paper and in that tender and gentle poem said:

We are the Dead. Short days ago
We lived, felt down, saw stars glow,
Loved and were loved, and now we lie
In Planets' Soles.

Well, some boys are lying out there. I do not know what I would say to the shades of those who made that sacrifice. I want to be sure, if I can, that it is not a vanity and that I fully recognize my responsibility in an anxious hour like this.

It was said the other day:

First. That our progress and our policies are suspect by friend and foe alike. Where, I would like to know? Who besides Bonnie Charles de Gaulle has been so bold as to affront us in this field? Thirdly countries are helping us now. Have you heard it from Australia? Have you heard it from New Zealand? Have you heard it from Korea? Indeed, not. The nations have been there in our corner. They did not always send troops, but there were other kinds of assistance that they sent.

So, is that a good sentiment to utter, that we are suspect by friend and foe alike? I do not know where it is, and I want to see the proof. And I do not like to see it go on the dispatch wires into every corner of the earth, to make a headline.

I remember once doing some work on immigration, trying to help India and when I got to Bombay near Calcutta, the headlines were that high—"India's Friend is Here."

Nothing is provincial here, or parochial; nothing is limited. What we say here goes on the wire. And if you want a lesson, send somewhere—I could tell you where—to get the international short-wave monitor, and see what is said on the shortwave stations from Peking and from Hanoi and elsewhere.

How good is it for the morale of the troops? You ought to be out there on the front on a lonely night, when the bombs are dropping or the mortar shells are coming over, and see whether it makes a difference. Oh, yes, they begin to wonder whether they are the forgotten men, and are forgotten back home. It is a shabby feeling. I can tell you that sometimes I had it on the western front a long, long time ago. That is one thing about which I want to be extremely careful.

It has been said that the President was brainwashed by a military-industrial complex. I would hate to have heard that, said about General Eisenhower, the grand captain of the second great crusade mission in world affairs. I do not believe anybody ever said it about him, great tactician that he was, great strategist that he was. They combed the Army to find him. And General Marshall was deeply attached to him. And so he became the grand captain.

Well, I can imagine how he feels about a statement like that. It does not sound good and it does not look good, because he was a Republican President who served us with honor and distinction. And it would not sound good about any President.

Have you heard the British deny their King and Queen? If you have, show

me the day and the time. Why, we were so circumpect about it that when the King and Queen were our guests, we set up a scaffolding in that regard so that the cameras would not catch the surrender of Bargeaux at Saratoga and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis. That is how circumpect we were. And I was then, roving around in the place, to find out what it was all about.

No, you do not demean the ruler. The President is not our ruler, but you do not demean him in the eyes of people abroad, for when you do, you demean the prestige of this Republic. And I do not mean to do it, as the one remaining great, free republic on the face of the earth.

Yesterday, this whole question about security came up. Where was our security? I heard the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee ask these questions. I am no tactician, goodness knows. I have been on the command staff school as a lieutenant, but I am no tactician. I am no strategist. But I do know this, Mr. President, from those with whom I have associated in government; that our outer defense perimeter started in Korea and went to South Vietnam. Now, you see, Saigon, in South Vietnam, is at the lower end. That is our left flank. Suppose the left flank of your line is turned and you lose Vietnam? Then what?

The distinguished Senator from Hawaii can certainly tell us about how close it is from the Philippines to Malaysia and to Indonesia. And you cite to me a holding station where you can hold if we lose Vietnam. There is no place south of Singapore. Anybody who has some perspective knowledge of tactics can tell you that. And when you are in Singapore, you are at one of the clogged water courses that I am confident, as surely as I am standing here, the Soviets are going to try to control. Control Panama, control Singapore, the two ends of the Gulf of Aden and Suez, and you have just about command of the world. That is all you need.

So you have to see this in perspective. There is no holding line between Saigon and Singapore. So when they speak about the fall of Southeast Asia, they are not kidding. And I am not disposed to quarrel with men who have gone through our military schools, who have worked out worldwide maps, and who are expected to plot this thing in the large. That is what you need for the security of the country.

There may be Members in this body this afternoon who may remember, as I remember, when during the war we went down to the Munitions Building for briefings by George Marshall, the Chief of Staff.

I almost fell out of my seat one morning. These were members of the Appropriations Committee. I almost fell out of my seat when suddenly, out of a clear sky, he said:

Guatemala, I may have had news for you.

We waited with bated breath. He said: Our best intelligence tells us that the Japanese are going to invade ALASKA, and for the moment we can't stop them. We can't reequip our troops from the Pacific. We think the strategy we follow is correct, and

if they invade Alaska, we'll have to let them do it.

What do you think the wave would have been in this country if the Japanese Army had suddenly invaded Alaska? I ask you.

Why, it would have been a wave of such Liberty that I expect people would want to come and cut the throats of leaders down here for letting our domain be invaded. But General Marshall was a soldier and a great one. He knew what he had to do, no matter how much he might be scolded and he kept the ship's nose in the wind. Everybody knows how we came out. He was right and I do not try to argue with them about it.

That is our outside security line. Suppose it fails. I think the Senator from Missouri could tell us the answer. It will run from Alaska to Hawaii, and you tell me how far you see from San Francisco and Los Angeles, as to whether or not our security is involved out there in Asia. If I did not think it was, I guess I would take another good long look at this whole business before we get through.

It has been said we have not emphasized the political needs and aspects of this controversy in the face of the fact that maybe we cannot get a military solution. Have we defaulted in that field? I thought they had an election out there to pick a constituent assembly. I thought they had an election out there. Senator Brewster and Senator Hiram Boren went there as observers from this side. They came back and said that in their judgment it was a fair and honest election. They brought back ballots with them and indicated exactly how the people went to the polls. It is not strange that in this second election in September a half million more people voted than had voted in the earlier election? Does that mean anything? It means we have done something to dispel fears in Vietnam and in showing back the Vietnam as that life can pursue its normal course. Has that been neglecting the political fabric? Those figures simply do not prove it.

I reemphasize these two facts largely because the point is made that our security is not involved. This is a pretty small consideration when one thinks of these high-speed bombers. The bombers are not at all satisfied with the speed we set today, and I presume that would be particularly true with respect to military aircraft. They have just tied this great ball into short reaches, and you see us from here to there in very short order. When you do so on a pair of wings, you can have in the fuselage the lethal and deadly weapons that will impair our security. Let no one say our security is not involved, and with it, of course, the peace of the world is involved.

Who can forget how fast these things move. Here was a student. I suppose almost everybody has forgotten his name. His name was Princip and he was standing in a doorway in the little town of Sarajevo. When the Austrian Archduke and his Dauchon, who were the heroes to the throng, came by, out comes the pistol and he shoots and both die before they get to the hospital. The legends are set in motion. The boots on the cobblestones

begin to sound all over Europe, and before we knew it we were caught up in a frightful conflagration.

What about this area in Southeast Asia? Are we there to stop aggression? I think we are. Are we there in the interest of peace so that the thing will not spread? I think we are. Are we there in the interest of self-determination, a phrase Woodrow Wilson used so often? I think we are. Can we do that without undertaking to police the entire world? I think we can. I am not insensitive to the fact that there is a limitation to our capacity in manpower, in finances, and in any other field you want to mention. No one can be insensitive to it today when you stop to figure the fever, turbulence, and problems you have everywhere in the world. But these are ideals and these are objectives that I think we can probably serve and I think we are serving them now. I think it is an undertaking to which we were committed.

I hear it said that we ought to stop bombing immediately, protect a day, sharpen up your forces, then say to all the world, "On this day we stop; on this day a ceasefire will stop everything. Now, if you, the enemy fail to desist in your hostility, then we shall feel free to use everything at our command in order to bring you to heel."

Well, have we not said some of that already? Oh, I rather think so. We have used a good many countries, like Britain, we used the Hanoi embassy in Moscow, people in Warsaw, and elsewhere, but strangely enough these things have not produced anything yet. The tragedy of it is that I think we have gone pretty far but, Mr. President, we could get no reciprocal assurances, and that is the danger.

I am sure we were willing and I am sure that sentiment was conveyed. If only those three crack divisions they had at the demilitarized zone would stay in their place, but Ho Chi Minh and his associates would give no such assurance. What would you deduce from it? If you would stop the only leverage we have now, those troops would have moved. And what about the Marines on the outside and north of the demilitarized zone? What about those who could become the forgotten men? I am not going to forget them. I am not going to see that kind of punishment visited upon them because suddenly we felt we had to stop this bombing business as a kind of last, desperate resort. It may be the war is a one-way street. Everybody discovered that from the day they invented warfare. There is a great troop risk involved when they counsel that kind of action.

But there is something else that ought to engage our recollection and that is what happened in Korea in 1951. We had a brilliant offensive mounted there and we were doing exceedingly well. Then, suddenly, a kind of inertia came into it. In some areas they reported that President Truman had issued a standstill order. He had not. You will not find it in history books or papers. That is not what happened. But the word went out that we were going to settle for the 38th

parallel and that destroyed the drive, and as a result it cost us 90,000 casualties.

Do you want to go down that anxious road again? Not me, not me. One lesson in history is enough and with 450,000 men, and perhaps more over there now, no sir, I am not going to expose them to that sort of thing and run the day that I do it. That will be a hanged memory with which to keep a rendezvous from that day on.

I, for one, do not propose to do it. In a recent speech, it was stated that we should end our search-and-destroy operations. The Senator has seen the Montagnards when he was in Vietnam last week. We could not bring them in before. Finally we had to go out and find them by searching the hills and the valleys. That was the only real technique we had which was effective for a time. But, it is said, we should stop it. We should end this business of search and destroy.

What kind of posture does it put us in? A defensive posture.

The moment we are on the defensive, we can no longer employ a technique of this kind. Is that what we want to do? Is that what we want to say to General Westmoreland and our troops out there? I do not.

Sooner or later the truth has got to come to the American people.

A great point was made about taking all this to the Security Council. That matter was argued in this Chamber for hours on yesterday, so if it had not been up there, they made a real endeavor. We have to get nine votes. Yes, there is no veto power where a procedural matter is involved, and this would be procedural. But, we could not get them. We could not energize the members of the Council to take a real interest in it.

Sappone, however, we did get nine votes. What would be the next step? Not procedural. It would have to be substantive.

How do we get a substantive matter out of the Council, with the Soviet Union sitting there with a veto?

I do not think we have looked all the way down that road. Inquiry leads me to believe that our Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, has not been wanting in trying to get some kind of action in the Security Council. He has not been successful.

Thus, Mr. President, in all the discussion had on yesterday, I do not think it came to anything because I doubt very much whether it was pursued to a real conclusion.

I fairly shuddered when the two newspaper editors, Ashmore and Baggis, finally got visas from the State Department and went out to Hanoi.

If I had been the State Department, they would not have gotten any visas, because they are both associated, as I understand it, with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, in Santa Barbara. That is where Robert Hutchins, former president of the University of Chicago, is. Senators should read some of the stuff that comes out of that center. I sent for and got lots of it. I delivered quite a lecture on one. The subject was "Justice for All, Freedom for None."

I wish I had my notebook with me so that I could read a few of the notes—they would knock your hats off as to what they had in mind as to the ultimate in a free society. Their idea was that our free society would have to be restructured, that there could be no freedom any more. Justice, yes.

But, I say, what will happen when freedom goes?

What is that old ditty—
No man escapes when freedom falls,
The best men not in King's path,
And those who say "appease, appease,"
Are hanged by those they sought to please.

Mr. President, that is one reason why our boys are in Vietnam. Let freedom slip, and it begins to slip everywhere.

We remember that Churchill said he was not made the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire.

Let me say that I was not made a Senator to preside over the liquidation of the holy fabric of freedom. May I be the last ever to approach that kind of task.

Well, Mr. President, Ashmore and Baggis go out there. I followed that pretty closely. I thought perhaps they were really going to "pin one on." But read between the lines. What and how much did they get out of Hanoi, if we stopped bombing? It could have eventuated into something. Not that it would. It just could. They came back empty-handed. But they had enough for a few headlines.

I assigned Ashmore and Baggis to the wastebasket. I received a letter from them exhorting me for identifying them with the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions.

Well, Mr. President, they have not heard the last of it. I say to my friends of California, they will hear a lot more on that subject before I get through, because if this is going to be the new politics in our country, predicated on the theory that freedom must be liquidated, then the time to start fighting is now.

Thus, I just "kiss off" Ashmore and Baggis after their escapades on the front pages. I doubt very much whether they will make any significant history from now on.

Now I get back to one more point, and then I think I have said enough.

In 1953 we actually went abroad in being the grand captain back, made him the head of our party and elected him to the Presidency of the United States. We reelected him in 1956. If there had been no constitutional prohibition on a third term, I make so bold as to say that Dwight D. Eisenhower had sufficient of the trust, esteem, and confidence of the American people to be elected for a third time.

Thus, it would occur to me that we who have been associated with him in a common party, we who have gone to see him so often at the Tuesday morning sessions at the White House, could very well, when we are baffled and troubled by problems of this kind, when we are disconcerted of spirit in what appears on the outside to be a kind of party disunity, we could take a little more counsel from him because he is a great tactician and a great strategist. He is now at that age where

he can speak with a wealth of wisdom and experience.

I can only hope that we do not wander too far afield so that, somehow, we go across that yet undefined line under which we might attribute to ourselves the conduct of the war.

It is a rather interesting thing—I have run down many legal cases before the Supreme Court—that I have found at yet no determination as to the power of the Commander in Chief under the Constitution. Thus, I would not wish him to invade our responsibility and I do not want to invade his. When he wants counsel, he can call—and he does; how many times we have been to the White House with the maps and the charts looking over them to see where we are and getting some better ideas about direction. Then we knew, I think, a little better, for our own comfort and the stability of our soil, what we should do.

So, Mr. President, that is the whole story. I am not disposed to argue it, as I said at the outset. I want to be sure only that I comport myself according to my own convictions and my own conscience, because I have a responsibility to myself, to my country, and to those boys who are out there in Vietnam now.

May we pray for them always. May we make no mistakes that will add an undue burden on, and an undue jeopardy to, a task which in itself is simply hazardous without our adding to it.

I do not want our boys in Vietnam to become the forgotten men.

Thus, in every step we take, in every word we utter, let us be sure that we have in mind those men who, at this very moment, are 12,000 miles from this glorious country, who are ready for any sacrifice, who are ready for any war, who are ready for any task in order to require their obligations and responsibilities as soldiers of the United States of America.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I have listened to the distinguished minority leader with a great deal of interest. All of us have very deep respect and affection for the Senator from Illinois, and certainly I have always counted myself as one of those who admire him very much. He has great talents and I particularly enjoy his comments. It pains me very much to have a different view on such an important matter of policy.

I have not the slightest doubt that he has the deepest conviction when he says he is not a Senator to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom. I am sure he feels that way. I feel just as strongly that the pursuit of this war under the conditions that exist is more likely designed to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom because of what could well be a war of indefinite tenure, indefinite existence, and possibly twelve China.

So what we are arguing about is not the objective. I think the objective of the Senator from Illinois and that of myself and those of us who disagree with the current policy in Vietnam are identical. We do have this difference of judgment, and it is a judgment based upon similar facts, as to the best way to go about preserving our freedom.

The Senator expressed his very deep feeling for the men in Vietnam. All of us share that. There are men from every State represented by everyone in this body, and we are all getting, almost

daily, notices of their death or injury. The difference is, I think, that those of us who would like to liquidate this war believe that we are acting in the interest of those men in Vietnam. We do not wish them to stay there. Also, we believe it is not in the national interest to do so.

So it seems to me the question is narrowed a bit if we get down to some of the issues that are related to this question. What is the objective of this Vietnam policy? Is it in the interest of this country and the preservation of our strength?

The Senator intimates, in one section of his speech, that our security is involved. Yesterday I said I thought our security was best protected by maintaining a strong country, and not wasting or spending our resources, manpower, and money, in South Vietnam. This is not a part of the world which it seems to me has ever been regarded heretofore as strategic and as of vital importance to the United States.

The Senator from Illinois mentioned President Eisenhower, a great general. When President Eisenhower was in office, this matter was presented to him in 1954. He very carefully selected his Chiefs of Staff, General Ridgway and General Gavin. They undertook a study of the landing problem in support of the French in Vietnam. Very wisely, after a thorough examination, General Ridgway recommended against it, although there were powerful people in that administration, including the Secretary of State, and Admiral Radford, who were for it. But President Eisenhower, exercising his responsibility as President, decided against it. I think history will prove him right.

General MacArthur had made a statement, not under these same circumstances, but after what had been his experience in the same area to the effect that it would be very foolish to engage in a land war on the continent of Asia.

I believe there are other leading military men who have taken that view. There has been a difference of opinion among the highest branches of the military establishment on this particular problem. But General Eisenhower at that time made a decision not to go into that area, Vietnam. I believe at that time there was the question of landing in North Vietnam, but, anyway, it was in the general area of Vietnam, and he decided not to go to the aid of the French.

We were at that time in a false position in supporting a colonial power, which is contrary to the tradition of this country. I think this whole operation from the beginning has been afflicted with this weakness. The idea that Vietnam would threaten the security of this country by bombs or other means is not realistic.

I assume that what the Senator is saying is that Russia and/or China will use it as a base to attack us. I do not know what other reason would lead us to say that what happens in South Vietnam is a real and direct threat to the security of the United States.

If it Russia that is the threat, I do not see how Russia needs Vietnam. It is a threat to the United States. At any rate, Russia, not so long ago, had soldiers in Cuba and withdrew them. If she is determined on such an attack, I do not know why she withdrew those missiles in Cuba.

This gets us into a very involved matter as to motives. With due respect, I do not see how what the Senator thinks will happen in South Vietnam is a threat to us. I agree with what the Senator said about the recent election and that the voter were cast, but most people agree that the conditions for the voting were determined by us and our proteges. It seems to me this would be quite similar to having a rule in Arkansas that only Democrats could be elected. I would feel that I would come out pretty well under those conditions and we could count the votes as they were cast.

But coming back to the matter of security, which I commented on yesterday—and I assume perhaps the Senator from Illinois had that in mind, because I said I thought that we are playing the Communist game—if that is what is involved, and I think it certainly is involved in the long term, I think that we are weakening this country. I think there is evidence that this country, not just

in the Senate, but in the polls, and the speeches, the statements of recognized and respectable people—they are not all peculiar people who are evidencing dissent in this matter—there is great confusion and much difference of opinion. But judgment from recent speeches by responsible Members of this body, I particularly think it significant that some of the Republican Members are reflecting their own maturity of judgment, and also, presumably, that of their constituents. I think that is a very healthy thing. I think this is the proper role of the minority party in any government, to take that position, to refine the issues, and to contribute to a refinement of policy which I hope will be wiser than the one we are following.

I do not think even the Senator from Illinois is pleased with our present situation. It is a very disagreeable thing, even though he supports the present policy.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Before the Senator gets too far away from Ridgway and Gavin—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield for a question, but I do not wish to lose the floor.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I think we have got to keep our history straight here. The Senator drew upon history. Let me state my version.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All right.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is based upon having been in North Vietnam in 1953. I was at Hanoi. I saw our Navy planes, that we had given to the French, take off in the hope that they could save Dienhienphu, the last French stronghold, as the Senator knows.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They did not save it. The French got backed.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Notwithstanding the fact that we poured 100 million American dollars into their effort.

Now, why were they there? They had been there; Indochina, as it was then known, was under French tutelage for more than 90 years.

They did not even train people to run the government. They were willing to train doctors only because of tropical diseases. They were there to conquer, not to preserve the freedom of a humble people. They were really there to subdue them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That may have been their motive.

Mr. DICKSEN. Well, it was the case.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But I dare say they did not cause nearly the destruction, in the 40 years they were there, that we have caused in 2 years. I am sure they did not kill anything like as many people, nor disrupt the economy and the life of the people in Vietnam as much.

I do not mean that we have done this because of bad motives; we have done it through lack of wisdom. I will say.

But if I may come back to it, the question which I think is central, and which we are really interested in, is what policy really serves the interests of this country. Surely just what kind of government they may have in South Vietnam is not of such importance to us as

to justify our risking 500,000 men. We have already suffered 15,000 deaths, and nearly 85,000 casualties. To compare that loss to our interest in the kind of government in a little country that has never before had a representative government, and say that we must give them precisely what we think they ought to have, does not make any sense to me.

It is the question of our security. I think that is of central importance. Surely we could agree that all that we are doing is not worthwhile, simply to give this little country representative government, or a democratic government, if you like, in which they elect people in the same fashion we do in Chicago, or in Harlem, or in Arkansas. Whether it is necessary to the security of this country, seems to me to be the crucial point.

I cannot see that it is crucial to our security. On the contrary, when you consider the cost that we are now undergoing, and what we have already suffered—the Senator knows how much we are spending; it is now estimated at the rate of \$30 billion a year. The casualty rate is twice as high this year as it was last year. We have already suffered, this year, more casualties than in all of last year. The rate is going up, and will continue to go up if the war is intensified, one would suppose.

Is it worth the cost? It seems to me that it could be only if this is a very strategic area, from the point of the security of this country. I cannot see that the proponents of the war have made a case, their argument does not appeal to me. I would be most interested, if anyone can make that point.

On the contrary, as I said yesterday, the Chinese first stated this thought, and I think it has some validity: If we were not there, they could not challenge the United States; they have no air force worthy of the name—the Chinese. I am speaking of now, not South Vietnam—that neither South Vietnam nor North Vietnam have anything that they could attack us with in self-evident. The Chinese have no air force, they have no navy worthy of the name; they have, we presume, a very primitive nuclear weapon, but no delivery system, as of now.

In addition to that, while we have apparently built up great fear and apprehension about it, there is nothing, really, in the record, in our hearings, or anywhere else that I have heard of, indicating any fervent desire on the part of the Chinese to attack us in the foreseeable future. That will depend, of course, a great deal upon the way we conduct ourselves, in regard to China.

But what we are doing is sending our men over there and having them slaughtered. We are spending our money, we are disrupting our economy, we are threatened with inflation, we are confronted with an enormous deficit; I do not know what is going to be done about the tax bill, but the news in the papers every day says it will have very hard sledding if that does not come through, there will be a deficit of some \$20 or \$30 billion. That will cause further disruption here.

Then there is the division within our country, the lack of unity and cooperation among our citizens, in carrying out our policies domestic as well as foreign, which is a very serious thing for a great and powerful country of this kind. The alienation of the young people—you can laugh all you like at hippies, but it is not just hippies. I have been to a number of universities where there are no hippies, or at least there are very few. The most responsible and intelligent young people of this country do not support this war, by and large. They have given every evidence of it in practically every university in the country.

Not that that in itself is decisive, but it is indicative of a lack of justification for this war. It has not been made a self-evident fact of life that it is in our interest to pursue this war.

There was no question of this sort in the Second World War. There was very little question in Korea. There was certainly none in the First World War. Why is it that there is such a great question now? Could it not be possible that the feeling of those who oppose this war could have some validity? Might that not be indicated by the fact that it is shared by so many people in this country?

All of us are elected here. I do not think that my fellow Senators who have expressed their opposition to the continuation of this particular war—and I say "this particular war" because it is not like any of the other wars which have been mentioned—completely ignore the views of their constituents.

To make it out that Ho Chi Minh is like Hitler is nonsense. His country has none of the power, or characteristic of power, that Germany had, and so on. That kind of an analogy makes no sense whatever to me. We have to judge it on the facts of this case; and it seems very strange to me that so many people in this country, of all types and characters, dissent from the pursuit of this particular war and the fashion in which we are pursuing it. I think it is something to give the Senate pause, and I believe that we should all participate, as are the Senator from Illinois, and his colleagues on his side of the aisle, and those of us on this side of the aisle, in discussing this problem.

I think the Senator has rendered a great service in opening up the subject. He always attracts attention to these problems, much more than any other Senator can, because of his own very special talents, which we all appreciate. But I think it is a very fine thing to discuss it, if we can arrive—and I hope we can—at an agreement about where the real interests, the vital security interests of this country lie, and what pursuits, what policies, would best promote them. If we could arrive at such an agreement, it would be the greatest favor we could render, not only to the President, but to this country.

The suggestions about using the United Nations, it seems to me, are entirely appropriate. We helped to create that body. We have been its principal sponsor. I do not think the suggestions that have been made should be dismissed because, in the

past, the United Nations has not been able to solve all these problems. I think it should be given a real try. And I do not think we have yet given it a real try, partly because of the feeling that it is futile. Under the serious conditions that now exist, I do not believe that we should refrain from doing anything possible, and I do not think we have, to obtain the agreement of the Security Council to put this matter on the agenda and have it discussed, and hopefully to have some resolution of it, with the assistance of the members of the Security Council.

I can only say that I hope all Senators will do as have the Senator from Illinois, the Senator from California, and others, in talking about this matter and seeking to resolve it.

All the other matters that we have before us seem to be connected with Vietnam—the foreign aid program has been affected by it, and almost all the other matters that have come before my committee. This morning we had a meeting on the Asian Development Bank. All of the consideration comes around to the question of what is going to happen to Vietnam. Unless we can resolve this, it is like a cancer eating into all our other policies. I think everybody knows that it is affecting our budget. It affects the tax bill. All of these matters relate to Vietnam.

If the Members of the Senate cannot discuss it and hopefully come to some agreement upon it by a clear majority, the country is going to be more and more divided. We are going to get in deeper and deeper trouble.

I do not know what the answer is. We have to make some agreement on it. It seems to me. It is an intolerable situation for the most powerful country in the world with all its vast resources at its disposal to be in this position, apparently not able to make up its mind. Its mind is not made up. Even though the President has control, he cannot carry on indefinitely without the real support of the country. I think we can agree to that.

Difficulties will arise in other fields. Difficulties have already arisen in other fields. They are not directly affected, but are indirectly affected by Vietnam.

So, I could not overexaggerate the importance of the Senate continuing the discussion and coming to some resolution. I do not quite see how we can come to a resolution, but we ought to be able to come to a resolution and a high degree of agreement as to where our interests are.

Is it in the interest of this country to pursue the war indefinitely with the escalating cost of money and lives? Is it in the interest of this country to bring the war to a close by some kind of compromise?

I do not think that approach has been explored as it should be, certainly through the U.N.

I commend the Senator for at least bringing up the question for proper discussion.

Mr. DICKSEN. Mr. President, certain it is that any war develops stresses, spiritual, moral, and emotional, that very often impel many people to take a given

course of action. Even in the War Between the States it was so.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was the trouble.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The party of Lincoln, when it came time to hold a convention, decided that there would be a rump convention and that they would not nominate the Commander in Chief.

The person who then corresponded to the Republican national chairman today because Lincoln with every talent he had to try to do something to get the soldiers back before the November election and to get this thing over and to receive some accolades from the South.

I think history will bear this out, that Lincoln met aboard ship two of them that had been brought through the lines.

Lincoln listened very carefully and then he took a piece of paper. At the top he wrote:

No. 1. The Union must be preserved.
No. 2. Slavery must be abolished.

He then said:

Conscience, you fill in the rest of it, the disposition of the horses, the military material, the feed stocks, all of that. You write that in there, but just leave No. 1 and No. 2 at the top, and I will sign it.

You see, we are up against a decision of some kind. No. 1. Do we quit? Do we retreat? Do we go ahead to a victory? Do we deescalate? And if we do, I think that we throw away whatever leverage we have?

What is the answer? I am content to go along in the interest of our troops with that position that does not forfeit our leverage in the hope that there can be negotiation and put it on thicker and thicker if necessary.

I learned long ago that it is the hit dog that yelps. They are being hit. They are being hurt, and they are beginning to yelp.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What does the Senator have in mind as the final outcome in this area? What does he want to achieve in Vietnam? Does he want a colony?

I wonder what the Senator has in mind that we wish to have there in the foreseeable future.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Do we have any commitment under the Southeast Asian Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Not to do what we are doing.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think so.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What are the commitments? It is a peacetime state.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are to cooperate with the other members of the Southeast Asian Treaty as to what course we should take. There was no guarantee that we were to come to their aid in South Vietnam.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No commitment as to self-determination?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I think you had better recognize that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have reexamined it. That is the opinion of a number of experts who appeared before our com-

mittee. I may say that the Secretary of State never used that as an excuse until about a year and a half ago. They give other reasons.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Maybe there was not an occasion for it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That was only involved in a minor way until we began to escalate the number of troops.

I wonder what the Senator has in mind. Does he think the United States security requires us to have a permanent presence in Southeast Asia or South Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I said nothing about a permanent presence. I mentioned, and I presume the Senator was present, that I probably have a different military concept in that we have an outside performer that runs from Korea to Vietnam. If that is there, what about the rest of Southeast Asia? And we will have to include Australia, New Zealand, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They are all part of it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Do I then understand that the Senator believes a permanent base there is necessary for our security?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, I think that after stability is restored at long last, they can set up their own military requirements in order to meet this threat.

Perhaps the Senator does not share my conviction that this is a Red threat. This is a Communist threat that proposes to liquidate freedom in South Vietnam.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I wish the Senator would explore that a little further.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Does it need any explanation?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it does. By way of background, a moment ago it was stated that this area of Indochina was a colony of France. France took it about 1870 or thereabouts, and they held it until they were forced out in 1954. And the leader there was Ho Chi Minh, the leader of the national forces which really defeated the French.

Mr. DIRKSEN. You stated why the French troops were there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was a colony of France. That is why they were there. It was a colony, and they were trying to maintain it as a possession which they exploited for its national wealth.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was colonialism at its very worst.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not know that it was different from all the other French possessions. They exploited it as they always have and as most colonial powers do.

What I am coming to is what do we have in mind? The Senator says that we do not have in mind maintaining a permanent presence there, and that it will not be a colony.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I do not think there is any doubt. This is a Communist threat. I do not want to see that line broken so that all of the rest of Southeast Asia is exposed, because if it is, then the whole Pacific coastline of this country will be exposed.

If that does not involve security, then I have no understanding of the word.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is making a real contribution. At least, we understand each other, if I understand the Senator, he thinks we should have a permanent presence there.

This, of course, leads to different conclusions. I do not wish to misquote myself or misinterpret the Senator's words. If that is true—and I gather from what the Senator said that it is—then certainly my theory is quite wrong. I mean, I do not agree with that view at all. I do not believe that would protect the security of this country. I believe that the security of this country would be better promoted, rather than establishing a colony there in place of the French, to have Vietnam a strong, independent country. I think we made a great mistake in intervening there.

I believe the analogy of Yugoslavia is a very good one. Vietnam would have been a Communist country, but an independent country; because they have had a thousand years of history, fighting the Chinese, to avoid becoming a satellite; and they succeeded in that up until the French took them.

This is an important difference. The President has never said that. I do not know whether the Senator means to say that or not, but I gather that he did say that. Am I correct?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I said it; yes, I did. Mr. FULBRIGHT. You did?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes. And yesterday you said our security is not involved at all. It depends on whether or not you take a global view of security. If you do not, the chances are that you are right. I take a different view, because we have conquered time, space, and distance to the point where this is a pretty small world.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I agree with that, and that is the reason why I think what I consider an obsolete concept of colonial bases is no longer adequate for security in this kind of world. I think we have to find new ways, particularly ways of working with countries such as Russia, rather than competing with them for bases in subjects such as South Vietnam. I think this is bound to bring a clash, bound to bring a nuclear exchange, which will not be in the interest of this country or any other country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Of course, that is a speculation.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What is a speculation?

Mr. DIRKSEN. What you just said. It is a speculation into the future, as to whether there will be a nuclear clash.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. You mean if we do not find a way to get along with Russia, it is speculation that there will be a clash?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is still a speculation in proportion, as I have seen these figures put on a blackboard in a good many places, as to how many people will be killed if they unleash nuclear exchanges, and whose people will be killed in greater numbers, and they run up into the millions. I cannot believe that mankind has so sloughed off its compassion and its conscience as to get into that kind of a hole—yet.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not think they do it deliberately.

MR. DIRKSEN. Oh, no. No. Mr. FULBRIGHT. We have rarely got into wars deliberately. You blunder into these wars. And what we are doing in assuming the mantle of the British Empire, and in beginning to accumulate bases such as Vietnam, is to expose us to the same kind of troubles the British had, to a gradual erosion of our power and of our influence. We have already, I think, lost the sympathy of Western Europe in this policy—not because they do not have great respect for this country as such, as a great country, but they question our judgment in pursuing this war, which they believe is undermining the strength of this country.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I cannot believe that mankind will blunder into this sort of thing. We did not blunder into it in Hiroshima or Nagasaki. That was done after the most prayerful deliberation. And when it was done, they picked up the pieces, assessed the damage, saw how many people were killed, and how by nuclear weapons you can convert a cool, placid river into a boiling stream. That is not lost on the leaders anywhere in the world, and I cannot imagine that they are going to blunder into that sort of thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I wish I had the same faith the Senator has, even though we continue the policies we have now that apparently inspire his allegiance to this policy in Southeast Asia, which is to fight off this Red menace, that he at the same time thinks they are going to be so reasonable that they will never engage in a nuclear war. I think you are trying to have it both ways. If they are as dangerous a menace as you would lead us to believe because of Vietnam, then, surely, we could have no assurance that they would not use nuclear weapons.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They know that nobody ever won an earthquake, and they are not going to blunder into this.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not see why the Senator thinks that they are behind Vietnam and that this is a step intended to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. They are certainly behind North Vietnam. Have you any doubt about Soviet weapons over there?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, no. But they are helping an ally. In the same way we have helped allies. That does not mean the Soviets are intending to use South Vietnam or North Vietnam as a stepping-stone to attack us.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We are not over there to conquer anybody.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why not? You just said we are going to have a base there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say we are going to have a base there.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was trying to develop what the Senator did say.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I certainly did not. We are over there to help South Vietnam preserve their Republic, their freedom, their self-determination, and, over and above everything else, freedom from aggression.

Now, why is the Soviet Union helping North Vietnam? For freedom's reasons? No. To conquer South Vietnam. That is

the difference. It is certainly a sharp difference in principle.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I need not tell you about this idea of aggression—the other side believes we are the aggressor. We have intervened in a civil war, a war between Vietnamese. The Senator does not deny that. These are all basically Vietnamese.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Basically, yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. And we do not live there, and it is a foreign country, and we intervened.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What would have been the situation if the Chinese had sent a hundred thousand men over here during our Civil War?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am glad I do not have to speculate on that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a civil war; and the assumption that everybody believes that this is an outright aggression by one national state or another is open to question: is it not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. It seems to me that from the very days of Ngo Dinh Diem—and I had many meetings with him when I was there—they were just trying to set up a republic to suit themselves. They were content to leave their neighbors to the north alone. That did not satisfy Ho Chi Minh—not on your life. He was going to bring all of what was ancient Indochina into the fold, no matter what it cost. That was the conflict.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. All we tried to do in the South, since the Senator referred to the Lincoln principle, was to set up our own government, if the North would leave us alone, but the North would not do that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. The North did not try to conquer the South. We had a Constitution.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But we did set up a Confederacy, yet the North insisted on conquering us anyhow.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, we did not; we took exception to Calhoun's Doctrine of Nullification and said that the South just could not walk out.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is what Ho Chi Minh said to Diem.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Ho Chi Minh had nothing to say.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. That is a different thing.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Just as Lincoln thought he should have.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, Lincoln did not. Lincoln was guided by the Constitution that applied to the Senator's State as well as it applied to his own State. The South walked out on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Before I sit down, I should like to have a clarification. I understood the Senator to say that we needed a base; that we intended South Vietnam to be a permanent base for the United States.

Mr. DIRKSEN. If I said that, I would have opened up the whole subject of colonialism, which is as alien as anything I know of to our concept of government.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I do not want to prolong the discussion, but I should like to clarify the question. What does the

Senator say is the objective of our war in Vietnam? What is it that we wish to achieve that is worthy of what we are doing?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I mentioned security. Obviously, it would take a long military lecture of global dimensions to persuade my friend from Arkansas.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; I mean what concrete effect would result in Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Did I not recite the right of those people to decide their destiny for themselves, particularly their political destiny?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Are we going to leave Vietnam?

Mr. DIRKSEN. We undertook to fulfill a commitment under the SEATO Treaty, while we did not ask for much in Geneva in 1954. I think we came away from there somewhat with the idea that if they had to have help and asked us for it, we would help. What happened?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Did not Diem ask us for help? We put him in office; he was "our boy."

Mr. DIRKSEN. We did not put him in; the people of South Vietnam put him there. Diem went around the countryside, talking to South Vietnamese farmers, rice farmers, and everyone else. He was a very popular person. I listened to him when he was on the platform at the time. We did not put him in; he put himself in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator mean to say that Diem was elected in a free election?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, I mean that he undertook, by going around the country, to get the trust and confidence of the people there. Then, too, of course, there had to be a leader to take over somewhere along the line. Who was a more natural leader than Ngo Dinh Diem? But we did not put him in.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The fact is that he created such a relationship that we had to come to his aid and support him all the time.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I am sorry to say that that case has been badly exaggerated.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There is a very grave difference of opinion as to the historical fact.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. But it is clear that the Senator does not wish us to incorporate this as a colony or a military base. He said that. And he does not wish us to be there permanently.

Mr. DIRKSEN. How often must I say that we do not go in for colonialization at all? As for setting up a base there, if I knew the meaning of the word—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are people who say we have set up bases there.

Mr. DIRKSEN. You say there are people. I have not heard them.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator has not heard them?

Mr. DIRKSEN. No, sir.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think it is very important to clarify what our purposes are in Vietnam. I would put it this way to see if it comes closer to the Senator's thought. The Senator says that we guarantee the right of self-determination, that they had an election, and that it was a good election. Why if that is so we do not leave or turn it over to them?

Mr. DIRKSEN. You have taken money up there and you have to make sure—
Mr. FULBRIGHT. That means we stay.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do? You have not heard my quarreling with what we have done. You have been quarreling for the last year about the conduct of the war.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is right.
Mr. DIRKSEN. What does the Senator want to do?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have said it.
Mr. DIRKSEN. Tell the Senate. Does the Senator want to quit now and pull out?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. What I would like to see happen—whether it will happen this way I do not know—is a reconvening of the Geneva conference, and our agreeing to abide by the result. We did not agree the last time at the last minute. We refused to agree.

Mr. DIRKSEN. We were not even a signatory.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Nobody was. There was agreement to it, and we refused to agree. We can neither claim rights under it nor claim other people's rights under it. The Senator is correct. We were not a signatory.

I would like to see a return to the principles of the Geneva conference. The President himself, at about the time of his speech at Johns Hopkins, said that was a proper basis. The North Vietnamese, have said that was a proper basis. I would like to see that, and a negotiation under the co-chairmanship of Great Britain and Russia; and that they come to an agreement as to a way to have elections, full and free elections, throughout South Vietnam to create their government; and we would come home.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Has the Senator heard Ho Chi Minh ask for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. No; but I have not heard as either. This is what I would like to see happen.

Mr. DIRKSEN. He is the guy taking the pasting. He is the guy being pushed around.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; and so are we. Mr. DIRKSEN. Why not ask, and see what the reaction is?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The reason is that he feels he has been unjustly attacked. I regret very much that he has not responded to these offers we have made. I think he is wrong for his benefit and for our benefit. Do not misunderstand me. What does Ho Chi Minh have at stake? A little God-forsaken country of 15 million or 16 million people.

We are threatening the security of the strongest country in the world, on which other countries depend economically, politically, and morally. This is a great undertaking and a great risk.

The Senator's expression of a moment ago reassured me when he said he was not a Senator to liquidate the holy fabric of freedom. Neither am I, but I think the course we are following will do it in the Miller end. We are expending this for what? Suppose we take all of Vietnam. Is it worth it? The price we are paying for this is all out of proportion to anything we can gain. We cannot do all of this. At least 15 or 30 million peo-

ple have an election. That is not the kind of objective to justify this.

There is surely something more that the Senator has in mind. Is he trying to develop it. Is it to have a permanent base? The Senator said "No."

Mr. DIRKSEN. No.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator had not mentioned anything yet to make me believe that this is worth what we are doing. That is about the sum and substance of it.

Therefore, I think we should return to the Geneva Conference and liquidate this war on the same basis the parties really involved, which were the French and the Vietnamese, agreed to in 1954, which we had a major part in disrupting and preventing from being carried out.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I see no reason for continuing this. I tried to emphasize my concept of our security line from Saigon and Vietnam to Korea. I still believe in the general field of global strategy that is our defense line, and if we lose it by having the flank turned, that means the line is shattered and the Pacific will no longer be a real defense to our country. As for freedom, it is an indivisible as well as a holy fabric. When it is impared in one place, that impairment continues.

What about the people in our country like those associated with the Center for Democratic Institutions, who, for instance, believe the line "Justice for all, freedom for none." They would liquidate freedom.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator mentions freedom. What does the Senator say about Greece? Here is one of our allies, and suddenly freedom is snuffed out, like that.

Mr. DIRKSEN. No; it is not.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Of course, it is. I read just recently in the newspaper that a former minister there made a statement critical of the government and the next day they arrested him. One woman refused to print a newspaper under censorship and they threatened her with arrest. There are 50 members of the Parliament who are still in jail.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It is only within the last 3 weeks that the newly elected Supreme, they call him, of the American Hellenic Organization, which is referred to as AHEPA, Mr. Andrew Panos of Chicago, who is president of the national association, has returned from Greece. He has been in my office. If ever there was a devotee of freedom he is. I have not heard him say yet they have been deluded of their freedom.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think there is a free government in Greece?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Yes, I do. Just because they have a military junta for a specific purpose for a little while to shove back the Communist influence—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Communist influence?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Surely, and it has been trying to move into Greece.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Is the Senator saying that the previous government was a Communist government?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I did not say anything about the previous government. You can

have a new government move in without there being a Communist government. We have Communists in this country, do we not?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a minor affair.
Mr. DIRKSEN. It may not be as minor as the Senator thinks. I am having trouble trying to take the bill off the Calendar to reorganize the Subversive Activities Control Board, only to be met with resistance in this Chamber, and probably more when the authorization for State, Justice, and Commerce comes here, when every veterans organization in the country is for it, so that the Board can go through. Yet, the Assistant Attorney General went before the committee and said there are 100 cases over at the Department of Justice that should be submitted to the Control Board. It is not a government. The influence, however, is here. Perhaps the Senator does not—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is a minor one. I think it is here. If we continue to follow policies as misguided as the present one, it will grow. I have not heard J. Edgar Hoover say recently that he was as much disturbed about it as he was 20 years ago.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Once upon a time it was minor. It was minor in Albania, Rumania, and Poland. But it is not minor any more. It has swalloved up all those countries.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Does the Senator think the Communists are threatening this country?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I say that communism is threatening the world. If it is not, then why this intrigue in Vietnam?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is a pertinent question. I was under the impression that since the death of Stalin, the dice of that branch—on the Chinese—was receding. It certainly has become less aggressive.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Did the Senator get that idea from Koenig's visit?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The strength of these parties, for example, in Western Europe, is not so powerful now as it used to be. In France and Italy it is still a major party. In France and Italy, about 25 percent of the electorate is Communist, although both countries have been making substantial economic and political progress.

Mr. DIRKSEN. What were the gains reported in the press made by the Communists in France?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Where?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I saw a little subbed on it.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. In what country?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I thought it was in France. I will look it up.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I did not even know they had an election in France.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was a local election.
Mr. FULBRIGHT. I saw a report on the elections in Bremen, Germany, where the right wing gained a little there. I saw that in this morning's paper. But I did not realize that communism is on the march, so to speak, nearly so much now as it was under Stalin.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It has never been off the march.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. As a relative matter, it is not so aggressive as it used to be. We have made considerable progress in various ways in adjusting to the Rus-

ship. The Senator himself, I believe, finally relented and supported the Communist Treaty this year. To me, that is just an indication. Not that the treaty is significant in itself, but it is an indication.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Would the Senator like to tell the rest of the story about the Communist Treaty?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was mentioning only that it was approved by the Senate. The press said—and I do not want to misquote without checking—that the Senator from Illinois did not positively oppose it. I think the Senator was right. Do not misunderstand me. I thought this was a sign of a degree of relaxation of the kind of fear and apprehension that afflicted us at the height of the Stalin era. I think we were quite justified in being apprehensive because Stalin was a very determined and resourceful man. But I think, since then, there has been a lessening of pressure, a relaxation of that conflict, that they are moving themselves internally more toward a different and more relaxed system.

Mr. DIRKSEN. All that has exactly nothing to do with it. I am sure that we can imagine the man who sat in my office—

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. DIRKSEN. And brought us all that information which I could not even discuss.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator is quite correct. I did not mean to criticize him. I merely meant to say I thought this was a sign that he accepted a change of an evolution taking place in the Communist world. I think in the Kremlin and in Eastern Europe there are signs of it. China is in a class by itself.

Mr. DIRKSEN. It was not a sign at all.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It was not?

Mr. DIRKSEN. Just coming to grips with naked reality.